CESR
Central Eurasian Studies Review

Publication of the Central Eurasian Studies Society

ISSN 1538-5043 (Print)
ISSN 1543-7817 (Electronic)

Contents of this issue

Volume 3, Number 2 Spring 2004

Perspectives

Eurasian Studies in Turkey, Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, Hayriye Kahveci, Işık Kuşçu

Editors - CESR Vol. 3 No. 2

Chief Editors: Marianne Kamp (Laramie, Wyo., USA), Virginia Martin (Huntsville, Ala., USA)
Section Editors:
Perspectives: Robert M. Cutler (Ottawa/Montreal, Canada), Edward Walker (Berkeley, Calif., USA)
Research Reports and Briefs: Ed Schatz (Carbondale, Ill., USA), Jamilya Ukudeeva (Aptos, Calif., USA)
Reviews and Abstracts: Shoshana Keller (Clinton, N.Y., USA), Resul Yalcin (London, England)
Conferences and Lecture Series: Peter Finke (Halle/Salle, Germany), Payam Foroughi (Salt Lake City, Utah, USA)
Educational Resources and Developments: Philippe Forét (Zurich, Switzerland), Daniel C. Waugh (Seattle, Wash., USA)
Copy Editor: Michael Davis (Kirksville, Mo., USA)
English Language Style Editor: Helen Faller (Ann Arbor, Mich., USA)
Production Editor: Sada Aksartova (Washington, D.C., USA)
Web Editor: Paola Raffetta (Buenos Aires, Argentina)
Indexer: Charles Kolb (Washington, D.C., USA)
Editorial and Production Consultant: John Schoeberlein (Cambridge, Mass., USA)

[Contents]

Perspectives

Eurasian Studies in Turkey

Ayşe Güneş-Ayata, Director, Center for the Black Sea and Central Asia, Middle East Technical University, aayatametu.edu.tr; Hayriye Kahveci, Research Assistant, Center for the Black Sea and Central Asia, Middle East Technical University, hkahvecimetu.edu.tr; and Işık Kuşçu, Research Assistant, Center for the Black Sea and Central Asia, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, isikkuscuyahoo.com

The break-up of the Soviet Union initiated vast changes in academic studies in Turkey. This paper examines the changes occurring specifically in studies in the social sciences. It traces the recent development of Eurasian studies in Turkey and explains how the shift occurred from a dominant ideological approach to one based on objective scholarly study. It indicates how this shift, accompanied by an increase of students with advanced training in Central Eurasian affairs, has transformed not only academic institutions in Turkey's universities and developments in the social sciences in the country, but also state and non-state policy-research institutions. It shows how the interaction among these different types of institutions influenced their respective research agendas. All these developments have increased Turkey's profile within the international social science community. The country's cultural and historical interests have facilitated intensive interdisciplinary research activity within Turkey as well as active international scholarly cooperation with institutions in the region, and with institutions and researchers internationally.

Academic Studies

Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the interests of Turkish specialists in Central Eurasia were more ideological than empirical. Notwithstanding this fact, significant anecdotal knowledge was accumulated, as people of Turkic origins immigrating to Turkey provided an important source of information. However, their experiences were strongly tainted by anti-communism and Russophobia. Systematic academic interest in the region remained limited, and the dominant publications were written by several ideologically-oriented groups, particularly pan-Turanian nationalists. A long tradition of pan-Turanianism in Turkey gave great emphasis to the study of the Turkic peoples within the Soviet Union, who, it was asserted, experienced dramatic oppression, acculturation and enforced migration, and the violation of basic human rights. However, this interest was limited mainly to the disciplines of literature and history, where the relevant texts were relatively more accessible. The inaccessibility of the Soviet Union to Turkish social scientists strongly contributed to the paucity both of interest in the region and of knowledge about it among groups with other ideological orientations. At the same time, Turkey's official foreign policy of non-intervention and non-irredentism discouraged serious research.

During the first post-Soviet years, the evolution of Turkish studies on Central Eurasia, and Central Asia in particular, was strongly influenced by the climate of opinion among Western and especially American elites, and was characterized by uncertainty in the international environment. Discussions among academic and political decision-makers and opinion-leaders focused on whether Turkey could be a development model for the newly independent states, especially those in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which have longstanding historical and cultural ties with Turkey itself. It was hoped that Turkey, with its secular state and Western-style market economy, could assume such a role and so diminish residual Russian influence in the region while at the same time preventing the newly independent states from drawing close to such states as Iran. So in the early 1990s, the Western powers encouraged and promoted Turkey's search for enhanced political influence in the region. Similarly, states in Central Asia and the Caucasus favored close and cooperative relations with Turkey, which they presumed to be a gateway to the Western world. Thus all three - the West, the states in the region and Turkey - looked forward to enhanced Turkish involvement in Central Eurasia.

The regional dynamics of Turkish foreign policy were strongly shaped by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. On the one hand, Turkey became anxious that its role in Western eyes as a "frontline" state in the Cold War might diminish. On the other hand, Turkey's international role became enhanced, thanks to cultural and historical ties with the region, and especially the newly independent Turkic states. Researchers in Turkey enthusiastically welcomed this new atmosphere, and their new work reflected this emphasis.

The interests of Turkish scholars in the region developed in parallel with the changes in Turkish foreign policy. Cultural, historical and linguistic ties made this part of the world attractive for the Turkish academics, especially among the young, who were excited by the rapid changes in contemporary history. Moreover, researchers in Turkey easily acquired the languages spoken in the region due to their linguistic similarity to Turkish. All this facilitated rapid growth in studies of the region and their peoples by Turkish scholars. This review surveys the evolution of Turkish academic interest in Eurasian studies in general and Central Asian and Caucasian studies in particular. Two features attract special interest: first, the themes of dissertations dealing with the region that were defended in Turkish universities; and second, the development of Eurasian studies in Turkish universities, as reflected in the proliferation of courses of studies and research centers devoted to the field.

The distribution of dissertations concerning Central Eurasia across scholarly fields of study is an especially useful indicator of shifts in the sociology of knowledge. Dissertation topics represent the interests of the newest scholars and therefore also have predictive value for the future evolution of scientific work. Also, the topics are chosen under the supervision of recognized authorities in the field and so reflect their evaluation of which topics will be most relevant in the sociology of knowledge of the near-term future. Using data from the search engine of the Turkish Board of Higher Education, one can profile the remarkable change taking place in Turkish academia. Table 1 depicts the growth of subject areas in which dissertations concerning Central Eurasia were defended in Turkish universities. Over the past decade and a half an increase both in the variety of topics and in the numbers of dissertations is clear from Table 1. There are four main periods from 1987 through 2001.

At the end of the Soviet period, 1987-1991, history was the only discipline in which dissertations concerning Central Eurasia were defended. During a second phase, 1992-1994, some dissertations were defended on historical and literary topics, but in the main these years mark a transition in the disciplines concerned with the region. Economics, foreign policy, and international politics began to be represented. Among the particular topics addressed were the possibilities for economic cooperation between Turkey and the newly independent states, and the question of Turkey as a development model for the newly independent states. Such topics were very much in line with Turkish foreign policy.

Ankara's enthusiasm for the renaissance of Turkic states of Central Eurasia found expression in 1992 through the creation of the Turkish International Cooperation Agency (TICA) as a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. TICA was explicitly conceived and designed as an instrument for channeling aid and investment to Turkic states. It sponsored frequent visits by specialists between Turkey and the newly independent states, and Turkey made promises to support many projects. The relative prosperity of Turkey's national economy during the first half of the 1990s also made it possible to grant a significant level of export-import credits. Turkey investigated the possibilities for assisting the newly independent states' transition to a market economy and TICA created some programs for this purpose. One of the biggest projects was in the sphere of education, where a newly created program was capable of receiving 10,000 students from the region into Turkey over the course of five years.

All these developments increased Central Eurasian studies in Turkish universities. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, Turkish interest in post-Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus was characterized mainly by exploration of the possibilities for Turkey's new role in the international system in general and the regional subsystem of international relations in particular, as well as by the kinds of cooperative relations that could be established with other Turkic countries and peoples. This emphasis changed as a result of recognizing the limits of the role that Turkey could play.

The data in Table 1 also reflect this change of emphasis. Thus, a third period from 1995 through 1998 shows decreased attention to the traditional areas of history and language/literature but also to such general descriptive topics as "the possibilities of economic cooperation between Turkey and the region" or "Turkey as a development model." From 1995 onwards dissertation topics ranged from literature to economics, politics to taxation, banking systems to education systems. Dissertations addressed specific questions concerning the problems of economic transition to a market economy and prospects for political transition to a democratic state characterized by the rule of law, in addition to such specific features as public administration. These were years of blossoming academic interest in the region. Not only a diversification in dissertation topics among various disciplines characterized the years after 1995; there was also an increasing level of country-specific research, due in part to the need for such specialized knowledge in the service of Turkey's enhanced economic and technical cooperation with countries in the region. Finally, during a fourth period, from 1999 onwards, there is a qualitatively and quantitatively still greater proliferation in both the number and diversity of topics.

In the 1990s, Central Eurasian studies saw not just the development of new fields of knowledge in Turkey but also a new stage in the development of social science research in the country at large. Until very recently, area studies in Turkey were limited to research on the Middle East, mainly because of the Ottoman heritage. These works naturally stressed the traditional disciplines of history and language/ literature. However, the proliferation of Central Eurasian studies into Turkish scholarly life in general and the social sciences in particular has led to a markedly increased emphasis on interdisciplinary approaches to regional studies. Likewise, the field of international relations is developing as an autonomous interdisciplinary field, no longer limited to theoretical discussions of dominant political science paradigms such as realism and its critiques. The failure of political scientists to predict the dissolution of the Soviet Union raised the importance of area studies and of alternative theoretical approaches.

Two other disciplines benefiting significantly from the growth of Central Eurasian studies in Turkey are sociology and anthropology. Anthropology in Turkey had always been particularly weak because Turkish social scientists had neither resources nor professional incentives for studying other societies. But the new situation offered opportunities for young scholars. Possibilities opened up both for the Turkish government and for Turkish academics through the joint creation of universities in countries other than Turkey, such as Ahmed Yasevi Türk Kazak University in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan Türkiye Manas University in Kyrgyzstan. Some young scholars, supported by university resources and scholarships, traveled and lived in the area, learning the languages, living with the people, and applying anthropological methods in their work there. Similarly in sociology and political science, comparative studies proliferated and the study of other societies became an accepted part of the curriculum in many of the more selective Turkish universities, which was not the case even a decade and a half ago.

Up to that time, the social sciences in Turkey, in contrast to many other countries such as the United Kingdom and France, did not include the tradition of studying other societies. Living in another country to study its society, economy and politics, learning its language, and developing a scientific perspective were uncommon. Many of the students who in the 1990s went to Central Eurasian countries to study these societies were not only pioneers in the opening-up of this field of inquiry but also, without exaggeration, makers of intellectual history within their own disciplines. Needless to say, these developments also had the very significant result of giving Turkish social scientists an opportunity to develop more comparative perspectives on domestic Turkish affairs and issue areas of Turkish policy and society. For a country such as Turkey, lying at the intersection of so many regional subsystems in international politics, that comparative approach is especially important for overcoming parochial views and achieving broader generalization and relevance.

Research Centers

The establishment of university-based research centers with a scholarly interest in Eurasia (including Russia) has contributed to the quality and quantity of academic work. From the mid-1990s onward, area research centers and institutes were established in Turkey; at present, there are ten such research centers active in Turkish universities.

As Table 2 illustrates, many of the research centers emphasize the study of the Turkic world, especially the history of the Turkic peoples as well as their languages and literatures. Indeed, many of the courses offered are in the departments of history and of Turkish language and literature. Altogether, Turkish universities offer a total of 332 courses in Eurasian studies. Among these, 109 are in history, 175 in Turkic languages and literature, 34 in political science and international relations, and 14 in the only degree program dedicated to Eurasian studies, which is at Middle East Technical University (METU). It is noteworthy that of the 48 courses in disciplines other than history and language/literature, 21 are offered by METU. Language and literature courses emphasize the teaching of various Turkic languages, such as Chaghatay, Göktürk, Oghuz, Azeri, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Kazakh, etc. The Department of Turkish Language and Literature at Hacettepe University offers the most courses, with 21 on different Turkic dialects or languages and comparative linguistics. Kafkas University ranks first in courses offered in the history of Central Asia, the Caucasus and Russia.

An interdisciplinary emphasis is to be found only at recently established research centers such as the Center for the Black Sea and Central Asia (KORA, or Karadeniz ve Orta Asya Ülkeleri Araştırma Merkezi) at METU. KORA's MA Program in Eurasian studies remains the only graduate program in Turkey that emphasizes the Eurasian region and uses a multidisciplinary approach. KORA's mission includes developing relations with scientific and economic organizations in Central Eurasia as well as outside it, coordinating and motivating technical cooperation with countries in the region, establishing and administering faculty and student exchange between METU and Central Eurasian academic institutions, and facilitating fieldwork and international cooperation in both scholarly and practical spheres.

Policy Research

Government development agencies and private think-tanks have also carried out research on Central Eurasia over the past decade. As noted above, the Turkish International Cooperation Administration (TICA, formerly the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency) deserves special attention. Mention will also be made of a representative foreign ministry policy-planning organ, the Strategic Research Center, and of one of the more notable recently established private think-tanks, the Eurasian Strategic Research Center (ASAM).

TICA is not the only Turkish governmental institution pertinent to Central Eurasia, but it is the only one directly covering the region. In the first years following its creation as the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its projects concerned the basic needs of the newly independent states, including the purchase of various types of equipment. Since 1999, it has carried out its program of action as a separate state ministry rather than as a branch under the foreign ministry; in 2001, its name was changed to the Turkish International Cooperation Administration. Its mission is mainly defined as promoting economic, commercial, technical, social, cultural and educational cooperation with developing countries in general, with priority to be given to those where Turkic languages are spoken, in regions close to Turkey.

Table 2 - Notes. Courses, Research Centers and Institutes for Eurasian Studies in Turkey (A) Research Center on the Turkic World (B) Institute on the Turkic World (C) Graduate Programs on Turkic Languages, Literature, History and Folklore (D) Center for Applied Research on the Turkic World (E) Center for Applied Economic and Social Research on the Black Sea Region, the Turkic Republics, and the Balkans (F) Research Center on the Turkic World and on Strategy) (G) Turkic Research Center (H) Research Center for the Caucasus and Central Asia (I) Research Center for the Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asian States (J) Turkic Research Center (K) Center for the Black Sea and Central Asia (KORA) (L) MA Program in Eurasian Studies (M) Center for Russian Studies

Developing in parallel with trends in Turkish foreign policy, TICA's activities by the mid-1990s acquired a more specific and practical basis. In particular, TICA has contributed to the development of democracy and free market economies in Central Eurasia and has opened new horizons in Turkish foreign policy. Its main mission evolved to focus on technical assistance and development projects seeking to improve and empower the institutional and administrative structures in the countries concerned. This included training of personnel in the banking and insurance sectors, the developing of structures of administration to encourage economic competition, assisting in the drafting legal codes, and enhancing the competence of local administrative bodies. TICA also provided technical assistance for the development of the agricultural sector, small and medium enterprises, transportation and infrastructure, as well as tourism and services. Since the mid-1990s, TICA has provided support to scholars and to academic research in the framework of its cultural and educational projects, including its "Supporting the Research of Turkish Scholars Project" conducted in association with KORA, which enables scholars to do field research.

A study of the activities of Turkish public institutions from 1992 through 2001 revealed that of the aid given, 25% was in the form of social aid, 58% in the form of technical aid, and 17% in the form of financial aid. Economic cooperation accounted for 9.3% of all cooperation, trade cooperation 7.6%, technical cooperation 15.0%, social cooperation 12.4%, cultural cooperation 52.4%, and education cooperation 3.3%. Table 3 indicates the number of projects undertaken by Turkish governmental institutions as a whole during that decade. The year 1995 marks a significant increase in these practical cooperation activities, just as it marks a new phase in the quantity and quality of academic work, as indexed by dissertation topics.

The traumatic economic crisis experienced in Turkey during the second half of the 1990s, which occurred independently of the developments under discussion, created problems in the country's cooperation with the Central Eurasian states even as its accomplishments and successes became manifest, including the accumulation of knowledge and expertise over time. Yet, aside from economic issues, problems in cooperation also arose for other reasons. It is necessary to acknowledge that there was a lack of coordination among the Turkish governmental institutions concerned with these cooperative projects. Thus, different institutions often undertook similar activities, repeating one another's mistakes and failing to achieve the desired results. Also, some of the projects proposed for the region were simply not feasible, due in part but not solely to Turkey's relative lack of experience in extending and administering technical assistance. (This problem has diminished over time through the training efforts of such institutions as the Japan International Cooperation Agency and Canadian International Development Agency.) Finally, it is clear that changes in the government in power at a given time can directly affect the successful implementation of a project.

Table 4 summarizes the areas in which TICA has executed projects in the region. For example, TICA offered substantial resources to projects in the areas of culture and history. A broad Turkology program involved assisting in the creation and development of Turkology departments in universities in Central Asia, facilitating the travel of Turkish scholars to lecture there, and identifying and administering restoration projects of historical significance. More recently, TICA's core mission has focused on training and consultation activities within economic and administrative projects. Here, the administrative and institutional experiences of the Turkish Republic provided an excellent basis for training personnel in different sectors such as banking, insurance, promoting free-market competition, and so forth.

Given the above-mentioned intellectual climate in Turkey prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union, including a basic lack of trained personnel, it will not be a surprise that neither government structures nor civil society had research centers devoted to analytical study of questions of international relations. It is worth mentioning two such research centers that have appeared on the scene since then.

First, the Center for Strategic Research (SAM) was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1995 to conduct research in international affairs and regional studies. It acts as a consultative body of the foreign ministry, with the aim of providing objective analyses of foreign policy issues for those in the policy-making structures. SAM benefits from participation by academics and scholars from prominent Turkish universities. It upholds its mission also by organizing seminars, conferences and panels for discussion and debate. Proceedings of some of these sessions are published in open-source (i.e., not classified or secret) periodicals.

Second, the private think-tank Eurasian Strategic Research Center (ASAM) was established in 1999, with the mission of carrying out systematic and scientific, interdisciplinary and policy-relevant research on the region. ASAM has a number of regional research divisions including departments on Russia and Ukraine, on the Caucasus, on the Balkans, and on Turkistan (Central Asia and western China). ASAM likewise organizes conferences and publishes books and periodicals in its field of competence.

Conclusion

On at least three counts, the emergence of Central Eurasian studies as a field in Turkish social science has had a positive effect on both Turkey and the region. First, throughout the last decade, academic cooperation between the Central Eurasian countries and Turkey has increased. Relations have developed more systematically, in a value-neutral manner detached from the emotional distortion that often characterized works in the field in the past. On a practical level, this has led relations between Turkey and the newly independent Turkic states to develop with more clearly defined goals. Second, Turkey's influence in the region compared to what it was during the Soviet era has risen dramatically, mainly thanks to student exchanges and Turkish entrepreneurs active in the region. Third, the proliferation of Eurasian studies in Turkey has driven the creation of a previously nonexistent technical bureaucracy dedicated to extending technical aid and cooperation with other countries.

In conclusion, it is fair to say that Turkey has made appreciable contributions to the development of scholarly studies about Central Eurasia. It has developed a fast-growing academic community characterized by a variety of research interests. This academic community is especially important in the international context because of its cultural, linguistic, and geographical propinquity to the region. Turkey itself is a natural bridge between scholars in the region and in the West, and this fact will both broaden and deepen future scholarship on Central Eurasian studies in the country and internationally.

[Contents]

Research Reports

Narratives of Migration and Kazakh Identity

Saulesh Yessenova, Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, sauleshinterchange.ubc.ca

Following the downturn of the "transitional" economy in Kazakhstan, hundreds of thousands of Kazakh villagers left their homes for urban areas. In my research, I examined the notions of identity, ancestry, and the nation that emerged in the narratives of recent rural to urban migrants in Almaty. Special attention was paid to how their experiences of displacement and adjustment to their new environment have been systematically misconstrued in urban mass media and social analysis in a fashion that resonates with the colonial rhetoric of the Soviet regime.

For this study, I conducted twelve months of fieldwork in 1999 (January-December), followed by return trips in 2000, 2001, and 2002. My interviews with Kazakh men and women who arrived in Almaty after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 formed my main method for collecting data. I purposefully sought to include in my sample migrants from different regions of Kazakhstan. I wanted to find out how regional and ancestral attachments play out in the context of urban migration to Almaty and whether patterns of migration and adaptation in urban environments resonated with national discourses. To incorporate voices from different locales, I made side trips to Astana, as well as Atïrau and Shïmkent, and visited two villages in Almaty and Zhambïl Provinces. Finally, through personal communication and analysis of Kazakh- and Russian-language media and scholarly literature, I collected opinions among second generation and old-time Kazakh urban residents, which allowed me to incorporate their perspectives concerning rural-to-urban migration in my research.

By focusing on my informants' migration to the city, I was particularly interested in learning their family situations (past and present), their decision-making concerning their arrival to the city and subsequent arrangements, their strategies for finding housing and jobs in Almaty, as well as their social relations in the city and across the urban/rural divide. In addition to oral narratives that I collected by means of unstructured and semi-structured interviews, I carried out a cognitive network analysis.

This network analysis helped me to reconstruct (at least partially) 28 migrants' communities in the city built around my informants' family members, kinspeople, and fellow villagers who were also co-habitants, neighbors, and/or co-workers. The migrant community may also include other individuals with whom former villagers have spontaneously reconnected in the city, as well as those whom they have recently met and to whom they are related occupationally, residentially, and/or by virtue of shared aspirations and interests. Through reestablished connections and new acquaintances recent arrivals get access to other migrant communities. These operate in the city and across the rural/urban divide; they are not isolated networks but form extended chains of contacts that help to address migrants' needs for services and comfort. These communities and their social connections formed a migrant "frontier zone" that emerged in Almaty after 1991.

Subsequently, I used a narrative method as a strategy of analysis, so that my discussion was organized around case studies formed on the basis of my informants' testimonies. This method was an effective way to foreground migrants' voices, which need to be heard and integrated into social and cultural analyses on post-Soviet Kazakhstan.

By focusing on recent urban migrants' own understanding of their social world and locating their narratives within a broader urban context, I argue that Kazakh identity, generally understood to be based on the idea of common descent, has been continuously reevaluated under the stress of the post-socialist transitional period. What seems to be an outcome of this reevaluation is the formation within the nation of particular spaces "in-between," where the ethnic name is consistently "hyphenated," such as "being Kazakh and being rural" as opposed to "being Kazakh and being urban." Based on two distinct sets of motives, predicates, and expectations (both originating in the ambivalence of the transitional position of their bearers in the nationalizing society and the globalizing world), these two perspectives, urban and rural, shape two sets of subjectivities caught in enduring opposition, building grounds for new forms of collective identities. As part of this argument, I trace how the rhetorical image of recent urban migrants' "otherness" - they are described in urban discourses as confused and resentful inhabitants of urban slums, who find it easy to engage in excessive alcohol and drug abuse, violence, and crime - enters the practical domain of social relationships in the city.

The claims of rural/urban identity manifest unequal power relations within the nation, echoing developmental discrepancies between the city and the village during socialism and thereafter. My argument here is that the legacy of this inequality allows the urban populace to exercise power over former villagers' images of the rural/urban difference, which they communicate to the larger world. By systematically misconstruing their experiences of displacement and adjustment to their new environment, these images depict former villagers as an obstacle in the society's transition from the Soviet state to a more advanced collective state of being. The fashion in which these images are structured resonates with the colonial rhetoric of the Soviet regime, defining Kazakh society as archaic, inferior, and, therefore, incapable of modern nationhood and self-governance. I demonstrate this contention with a reference to the work of several Kazakh social scientists who ascribe to migrants a sociocentric ("clan") orientation, which, they claim, has its origins in the outdated "tribal" ideology of the Kazakh nomadic past and still characterizes the social environment of the Kazakh countryside.

By juxtaposing migrants' personal testimonies with urban discourses that reflect more privileged standpoints, I have been able to undertake a more nuanced analysis of Kazakh culture, identity, and society in the post-socialist urban milieu, which I have located within broader historical and theoretical contexts. Ultimately, attention to local meanings and engagements has made clear the flaws of existing analytical frameworks.

First, attention to local meanings highlights Kazakhs' agency - something that is downplayed in usual approaches. Much Western literature argues that Soviet authorities had defined the republics' political borders as well as Kazakh ethnic boundaries on the basis of their own considerations and to the best of their knowledge; in this view, the Soviet state was exclusively responsible for the ethnic/national imagination developed among the Kazakhs later in the century. This framework, figuring Kazakh ethnic identity as merely imposed on the society by the Soviet regime, appears to be too simplistic.1 It downplays the role of local efforts to define Kazakh ethnic identity within the realities of a Kazakh cultural repertoire, especially genealogy and the idea of common origins both stemming from the shezhire, historical narratives articulating ancestral ties. And as a result, it fails to make sense of postsocialist ambiguity and contestation within Kazakh society.

Second, attention to local meanings problematizes simplistic primordialist views on identity. A second influential framework, which was also picked up by Kazakh scholars in socialism's aftermath, produced narratives that, using Chatterjee's phrase, "continue to run along channels excavated by colonial discourse" (Chatterjee 1993: 224). Here, Kazakh identity was understood through the prism of social divisions into tribes and clans transplanted fairly unchanged from the past into the present-day culture and social reality, fueling and being fueled by underdevelopment, especially in rural areas. The problem with this approach is that, by following the lines of functional analysis, it fails to recognize that the shezhire may only seem to represent some sort of "a long established pattern of values," which in turn "implies a rigid mental outlook or rigid social institutions," as Mary Douglas (1969: 4-5) insisted in her critique of a materialist treatment of religion. We cannot simply assume that social/ethnic processes in Kazakh society form a practical image of the ordering principles suggested in the shezhire. In the context of post-socialist rural to urban migration, invocations of the shezhire convey migrants' experiences of migration, distance, belonging, shaping their sense of self, negotiation of family relations, and how they construe their ethnic universe. In this sense, the assumption of Kazakh roots deriving from the shezhire is a narrative reconstruction of their routes in time and space that helps them to make sense of their experiences and links them to larger collectivities from family to the nation.

References

Chatterjee, Partha

1993 The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Douglas, Mary

1969 Purity and Danger. London: Routledge.

Esenova [Yessenova], Saulesh

2002 "Soviet nationality, identity, and ethnicity in Central Asia: historic narratives and Kazakh ethnic identity," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 22 (1) 12-36.

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Uzbek Communities in the Kyrgyz Republic and Their Relationship to Uzbekistan

Matteo Fumagalli, PhD Candidate, School of Social and Political Studies, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK, m.fumagallisms.ed.ac.uk

Identity politics has gained new salience in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse. The newly established polities, in most cases achieving unexpected independence, had to replace Soviet identity with alternative constructs. The fragmentation of the former Soviet space has often left ethnic groups scattered across the newly established borders, and the accommodation of cultural and political allegiances in multiethnic countries has become a central challenge to state- and nation-building in the Central Eurasian region.

In my doctoral research I explain the process of ethno-political mobilization among Uzbeks living outside the Republic of Uzbekistan. Particular focus is on mobilization strategies, modes of action, and relations between Uzbeks and Uzbek organizations on the one side, and state and supra-state actors on the other. I decided to focus on "Uzbeks abroad" for two reasons. First, the way an ethnic minority relates to the state of residence and country where the majority of co-ethnics are concentrated (kin country) carries high salience for state and nation building processes. Minority groups may pursue different strategies vis-à-vis the state of residence, ranging from "loyalty" to "exit" and "voice," to use the typology conceptualized by Albert O. Hirschman (1970). The behavior of minority groups tends to be influenced by the approach (inclusive or exclusive) adopted by the institutions of the state where they live. This is a dynamic and multidirectional relationship rather than a unidirectional one. In fact, group strategies and behavior influence state policies and possibly modify the way the state frames its relations with the group. In the case of stranded minorities, an equally important relation is that between the minority group and the kin country. Minorities can construct their identity as members of a diaspora[1] emphasizing their links with cross-border communities, or they can adopt different strategies privileging integration with the state of residence. Alternatively, the kin country can also adopt an active diaspora policy or decide to ignore co-ethnics altogether.[2] In sum, understanding how this set of relations develops can shed light on the strategies of mobilization adopted by the group (organizations), the rationale behind them, and their impact on state- and nation-building.

The second reason for my focus on Uzbeks outside of Uzbekistan is that the issue of cross-border minorities, especially the so-called Russian diaspora, has caught increasing scholarly attention over the past decade (Kolstø 2001, Laitin 1998, Melvin 1995, Zevelev 2001), but the dynamics of identity formation among cross-border Uzbeks in post-Soviet Central Asia have rarely been the object of research (Liu 2002, Megoran 2002). Field reports and studies on Uzbekistan's path to independence (Bohr 1998; Melvin 2000) primarily emphasize the security implications of Uzbekistan's behavior towards "Uzbeks abroad," and the geopolitical significance of the latter.[3] However unlikely it might seem at the moment, the possibility that Uzbeks might act as a "fifth column" of Uzbekistan has raised concern in the Kyrgyz Republic, and brought the under-studied question of cross-border Uzbeks to international attention.[4]

Research Content, Questions, and Methods

In this report I discuss the preliminary findings of my study of how Uzbek communities in the Kyrgyz Republic relate to the kin country, the Republic of Uzbekistan. I present findings on two issues: Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks' perception of Uzbekistan as kin country and/or ancestral homeland of the Uzbek people, and their political assessment of Uzbekistani policy towards Uzbek co-ethnics abroad. During interviews I asked the following questions: What is your homeland? What is Uzbekistan to you? Does Uzbekistan defend the interests of its co-ethnics in the Kyrgyz Republic? How do you rate Uzbekistan's policy towards Uzbeks in the Kyrgyz Republic? Who should defend the interests of the Uzbek population?

The findings are based on fieldwork that I conducted in the Kyrgyz Republic in June and July 2003. Research was conducted in the southern Kyrgyzstani provinces of Osh, Jalalabad, and Batken, where the Uzbek populations are concentrated. Additional data were collected in Bishkek from members of the political elite who are also deputies either in the Jogorku Kenesh (Kyrgyzstan's National Parliament), or in the Kyrgyzstan People's Assembly (the consultative body established as a forum for the country's nationalities). I selected the cities for the study on the basis of both demographic concentration of the Uzbek population and the political significance of the location in the country (i.e., Osh is the country's southern capital, and Jalalabad is the center of the eponymous province and the area where Uzbek organizations are traditionally active). The sample consists of 140 respondents selected from the local political, economic, and cultural elite.[5]

To overcome the political sensitivity of my research subject I used reputational and purposive selection methods to identify potential respondents. The initial respondents referred me to additional respondents. This selection process carried the risk of producing a skewed sample since respondents might point to acquaintances with similar characteristics. However, this was rarely the case, and overall I achieved a sample covering diverse views on the topics investigated. I concentrate on elites rather than common people, or a combination of the two. Although I do not consider masses as irrelevant or "mere followers" in mobilizational processes, I view elites as key actors, whose access to material (e.g., money and technology) and intangible resources (e.g., loyalties and skills) enables them to mobilize masses and act as "ethnic entrepreneurs." Jones Luong also holds that studying elites is particularly enlightening in societies undergoing transformation, as they occupy a crucial place in the state structure and the decision-making process (2002: 23). Understanding their behavior and rationale allows scholars to explain the mechanisms of political change.

In the early stages of my research I designed interviews and surveys in the Russian language for three reasons. First, I am more fluent in Russian than Uzbek. Second, I needed to avoid linguistic problems that I encountered in May 2003 while conducting a seminar on nationalism for the Open Society Institute in Tashkent. The seminar was in English with simultaneous translation into Uzbek, and the translation of some common terms such as nationality or self-consciousness generated problems and disagreement. Third, when I moved to Kyrgyzstan I found that some Uzbek respondents, especially among the political elite, were more fluent in Russian than Uzbek. Although the use of Uzbek is highly promoted in Uzbekistan among the academic community and high-ranking officials, that is not the case within Uzbek communities of neighboring countries, where Russian constitutes the lingua franca (official or not).[6] All in all, the choice of Russian did not present drawbacks.

Research was divided into two stages. The first stage consisted of a small-scale survey investigating the respondents' perception of Uzbekistan and their indication of homeland. The second stage sought to elicit an assessment of Uzbekistan's policy towards the Uzbek population living outside of Uzbekistan. The survey results are reported below.[7]

Survey Results

I asked respondents to indicate what they perceived to be their homeland [rodina]. The options available on the questionnaire were: Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, city, region, and other (blank space for respondents to specify his/her option).[8]. Kyrgyzstan was indicated by exactly half of the respondents (50%), whereas Uzbekistan was considered as homeland by 3.7%, far less than those considering their own city as homeland (36%). A marginal percentage of the respondents indicated the region as their homeland (4.4%), and 5.9% chose other options.[9] I found no significant association between the responses and demographic variables (sex, age, etc.), except for the location. The analysis shows an urban/rural divide,[10] where urban dwellers appear more inclined than the rural residents to consider Kyrgyzstan as their homeland, while respondents from the outskirts of cities are more likely to consider their city as homeland.

Having established that only a small portion of the sample considered Uzbekistan as their homeland, I examined the meanings Uzbeks attach to the word "Uzbekistan." The survey asked respondents to indicate briefly what Uzbekistan meant to them. I explored this question further through follow-up individual interviews. Twenty-five respondents (46.2%) indicated that Uzbekistan is "a neighboring country," without adding any further comment. Sixteen (29%) considered Uzbekistan as their (ethnic) homeland, in remarkable contrast with the responses to the earlier question. Six respondents (11.1%) added comments, some negative (critical of Uzbekistan's leadership), and some positive (emphasizing achievements in the post-independence era).[11] The segment of the Uzbek population that assumed a more critical stance toward the Uzbek government in Tashkent was young men, predominantly students, journalists, and teachers. Alluding to the tight Uzbek border policy and visa regime, Uzbekistan's "lack of hospitality" was a common theme. The younger generation was also more likely to be critical of Uzbekistan's regional politics. Incidents between Uzbek border guards and police, and the latter's incursions in Kyrgyzstani territory are recurrent. Shootings and incidents of deaths at the border deeply affect the local population. Most lamentable is the fact that it is impossible to visit relatives across the border even for weddings and funerals. Visa requirements and related expenses have had an impact not only on the practicalities of living at the border, but on its perceptions as well.

The second phase of the study looked at Uzbek views of Uzbekistani-Kyrgyzstani relations from a different angle. Respondents were asked to express their views on Uzbekistan's policy towards Uzbek co-ethnics abroad. The choice of elites as respondents seems here particularly appropriate: they have more influence at the political level as they are involved with local, state, and possibly Uzbekistani authorities. They also have resources to frame the perceptions of common people. I asked the respondents to comment on two inter-related topics: first, to identify and assess Uzbekistan's policy to defend the interests of the Uzbek population living in the Kyrgyz Republic; and second, to indicate which institutions they expected to defend or support Uzbek interests.

Data appear to be in line with the findings of the earlier questions on perceptions of Uzbekistan. About seven out of ten respondents (69.5%) noted that Uzbekistan does not defend or support the interests of Uzbek co-ethnics in Kyrgyzstan. Approximately one in ten of the respondents (13.4%) shared the opposite view. The respondents' views on Uzbekistan's policy were more mixed. About one in three respondents (37.8%) saw no difference in the impact Uzbekistan's policy might have on Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks. One in four (25%) viewed Uzbekistan's policy as having a fall-out, and 17% of the respondents gave positive evaluations.

Finally, I asked the respondents' opinion on who should be responsible for defending the interests of the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan. Not a single respondent indicated Uzbekistan as an actor to defend the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyzstan. By contrast, more than half (56.6%) of the respondents expressed the view that Kyrgyzstani institutions should be defending the interests of the Uzbek population (as a national minority). According to 20.3% of the respondents, it should be a duty of all citizens of the republic to defend the interests of the Uzbek minority. Uzbek organizations, such as the "Republican Uzbek National-Cultural Center" and the "Society of Uzbeks," are not highly regarded, and are not expected by many to accomplish this role (10.1%). International organizations are also given only marginal consideration (8.0%).

Preliminary Findings

The respondents show a rather "disenchanted" view of Uzbekistan. While there is a discrepancy between the answers to the questions on the meaning attached to Uzbekistan and the naming of homeland, Uzbekistan does not occupy a central place in the imagination of Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks. On the contrary, a positive assessment of Uzbekistan's policy towards Uzbek co-ethnics is rare. The reported systematic refusal by Uzbekistani authorities to strengthen contacts with Uzbek organizations in Kyrgyzstan adds to the difficult relations between the Uzbekistani authorities and Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks. In conclusion, Uzbek elites do not look at Tashkent for inspiration or support. A comment from an Uzbek deputy at the Jogorku Kenesh in Bishkek serves as an illustration of that. When asked if he thought that Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov had forgotten about Kyrgyzstani Uzbeks, his immediate reply was: "Karimov did not forget us. In fact, he never remembered."

References

Bohr, Annette

1998 Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

Harrison, Lisa

2001 Political Research: An Introduction. London: Routledge.

Hirschman, Albert O.

1970 Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Response to Decline in Firms, Organizations, States. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

International Crisis Group

2002 Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential. Asia Report 33, April 4.

Jones Luong, Pauline

2002 Institutional Change and Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

King, Charles, and Neil J. Melvin

1998 Nations Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Kolstø, Pål

1996 "The new Russian diaspora. An identity of its own? Possible identity trajectories for Russians in the former Soviet Republics," Ethnic and Racial Studies, 19 (3) 609-639.

1999 Nation Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

2000 Political Construction Sites. Nation-building in Russia and the post-Soviet States. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Laitin, David D.

1998 Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Liu, Morgan

2002 "Recognizing the khan: authority, space, and political imagination among Uzbek men in post-Soviet Osh, Kyrgyzstan." PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Megoran, Nicholas W.

2002 "The borders of eternal friendship? The politics and pain of nationalism and identity along the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley boundary, 1999-2000." PhD Dissertation, Cambridge University, UK.

Melvin, Neil J.

1995 Russians beyond Russia: The Politics of National Identity. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.

2000 Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic.

Zevelev, Igor

2001 Russia and Its New Diasporas. Washington, D.C.: USIP Press.

[Contents]

Politics and Public Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Higher Education Reform in Kyrgyzstan

Askat Dukenbaev, Assistant Professor, International and Comparative Politics Department, American University-Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, askatdmail.auk.kg

Research Methodology

The aim of my research is to understand the role of politics in the educational policy of Kyrgyzstan. In particular, the study focuses on reforms in higher education since 1992. I apply a theoretical framework designed to analyze issues of policy origin, adoption, implementation, and outcomes (Levin 2001). With this framework in mind, I focus on the following questions: 1) Origins: Where did particular reform proposals come from? How did they become part of the government agenda, when so many proposals do not? What role did various actors and interests play in the development of reform programs? 2) Adoption: How do policies as finally adopted or made into law differ from those originally proposed? What factors led to changes between proposals and approval? Who supported and proposed various policies, and to what effect? 3) Implementation: What model of implementation, if any, did the government use to put the reforms into practice? What "policy levers" were used to support the reforms? How did universities respond to the reforms? 4) Outcomes: What were the intended and unintended effects of the reforms? How did the reforms affect student outcomes and learning processes at the universities?

To answer these questions, my research has employed semi-structured interviews with key actors at major policy-making institutions of the Kyrgyzstan higher education system, such as the administrative staff of the relevant departments of the Ministry of Education, members and administrative staff of the Committee on Education of the Kyrgyzstan parliament, key staff members of the Department on Social Policy and the Commission for Education and Science in the Presidential Administration, university rectors, members of university administrations in Bishkek, former higher education public servants, university students, and alumni. Obtaining data from administrative agencies and scheduling interviews with high-level policy-makers, especially in the Presidential Administration, constituted the major challenge in the data collection stage. In time, I gained access to all of the above-mentioned institutions and established good working relations with insiders in the administrative units. These ties became very helpful in obtaining documents, such as legislative regulations, statements of policy-makers, and survey results in the field of higher education. In total, I interviewed 25 people from the above-mentioned institutions.

The questionnaire used in the face-to-face interviews contained 15 open-ended questions aimed at 1) understanding the role of a unit in policy initiation, formulation, and implementation; 2) identifying the level, forms, and outcomes of interactions during the policy-making process with outside parties, such as political and administrative bodies, and informal groups; 3) analyzing the cases of politically motivated decisions.

Major Actors in Educational Policy-Making in Kyrgyzstan

Presidential Administration. According to the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, all three branches of the government - executive, legislative, and judicial - are responsible for policy-making. In practice, policies are initiated and formulated mainly by the Presidential Administration's Social Policy Department and Commission for Education and Science. For example, President Akaev's statements on education are binding for educational policy institutions and groups, including the Ministry of Education and the Committee on Education in the legislature. Another example is related to the law "On Education," which was signed by President Akaev in 2003 only after the parliament incorporated into law all of his recommendations.

Ministry of Education. Formally, the Ministry of Education - whose major functions include certification, licensing, financing, state education standardizing, and planning - has some autonomy in implementing educational policy. In reality, the President has significant influence on the decision-making process at the Ministry. The level of autonomy seemingly varies from one Minister of Education to another as long as new policies and decisions conform to the broad political aims of the Presidential Administration. For example, two major breakthroughs in educational reform in Kyrgyzstan took place in 1992-1993 and 2001-2002. In both periods, the Ministry of Education was headed by reformist ministers, who had the vision, leadership skills, charisma, and political popularity to introduce significant innovations into the educational system in Kyrgyzstan. Their personal abilities enabled them to secure considerable support (at least at the initial stages of the reforms) from high-level officials, including the President himself. Therefore, during these two periods the Ministry of Education clearly enjoyed higher autonomy from the Presidential Administration, exercised greater authority in policy-making, and cooperated with more societal groups than at any other time.

Committee on Education of the Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh). Preliminary findings of the research suggest that this Committee's role is limited to legislative functions (initiating, adopting, and amending laws), and the ability to make budgetary allocations for the educational sector while passing the country's state budget, which is very rarely implemented in full. For example, the two new major laws on education - "On the Status of the Teacher" (2001) and "On Education" (2003) - were initiated by members of the Committee. However, they were adopted with "corrections" made by one of the divisions of the Presidential Administration acting hand-in-hand with the government. Currently, the Committee is drafting laws "On Pre-School and School Education," "On Higher and Post-Graduate Education," and it is planning to work on the educational legal code.

Rectors of Higher Education Institutions. Partial delegation of some functions of the Ministry of Education to universities, mainly in managerial and financial matters, is one of the outcomes of educational reform in Kyrgyzstan. Universities also have received the right to determine their internal activities, as long as they correspond to the state standard and general curriculum framework approved by the Ministry. For example, today most universities elect their rectors and can make independent decisions on collection and allocation of funds received from fees for educational services (UNDP 1998: 46). In addition, many local rectors established formal and informal contacts with high-level government decision-makers (e.g., some rectors have been appointed as official advisers to the President), becoming part of the political establishment. As a result, the rectors have become a very powerful and resourceful network that can strongly oppose any innovations - such as creation of a board of trustees, which puts the rector and the university's financial resources under its supervision and control - that might threaten their personal interests and positions.

Politics and Higher Education in Kyrgyzstan: Initial Conclusions

The initial conclusions of my research suggest that the country's educational policy is highly politicized, and has become an important tool in political mobilization, socialization, and state-building. Since independence in 1991, promotion of the cultural values of the "titular" nationality - ethnic Kyrgyz - has become one of the major questions on the political agenda of Kyrgyzstan. The Ministry of Education plays a pivotal role in this process. One of the basic aims of the "State Educational Doctrine" adopted in August 2000 by Presidential decree is to "preserve national cultural traditions" (Government of the Kyrgyz Republic 2000). Ratified in 2003, the new law "On Education" also stipulates that educational policy in Kyrgyzstan should be based on the principle of "the priority of universal human values combined with national cultural heritage, upbringing in terms of citizenship, hard work, patriotism, and respect for human rights and liberties" [emphasis added]. The requirement to obtain the Ministry of Education's approval for the university's curriculum is one of the policy implementation tools. Finally, in February 2004 the Ministry of Education issued its decision to introduce a compulsory examination on the history of Kyrgyzstan for all graduating students as of 2004.

Also, university students and their faculty are regularly mobilized for participation in official events, such as presidential elections, referenda, national celebrations, officially organized public meetings, rallies, and conferences. For example, in January 2003 on the eve of the referendum on constitutional amendments, the Ministry of Education delayed the beginning of winter break at the related universities so as to keep students on campuses to be marshaled to the referendum. The Ministry also ordered the universities to set up "groups to clairfy the referendum's goals and purposes, organize talks, discussions, roundtables, and other special events among students and faculty" (Vechernii Bishkek 2003).

Another characteristic of the policy process in higher education is its high degree of centralization restricted to interactions mainly among the four institutions: 1) Presidential Administration, 2) Ministry of Education, 3) Parliament, and 4) major universities. I maintain that a more open and pluralistic policy-making process (with institutionalized involvement of non-governmental groups) is necessary to make the policy decisions more rational and their implementation more effective. Such change, in its turn, requires further liberalization of the political and administrative system of Kyrgyzstan.

Research on this project has been carried out under the framework of the Open Society Institute Higher Education Support Program's Central Asian Research Initiative project (October 2002 to August 2004). Logistical support has been provided by the East-West Center for Research and Intercultural Dialogue of the American University-Central Asia (AUCA) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. One of the final goals of the project is to publish an article on educational policy-making in Kyrgyzstan, and design an undergraduate course entitled "Politics and Bureaucracy in Kyrgyzstan" to be offered at the AUCA.

References

Government of the Kyrgyz Republic

2000 Educational Doctrine of the Kyrgyz Republic. Attachment to the Presidential Decree "On state educational doctrine of the Kyrgyz Republic." Bishkek, August 27.

Levin, Benjamin

2001 "Conceptualizing the process of education reform from an international perspective," Educational Policy Analysis, 9 (14), Arizona State University. http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v9n14.html

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

1998 Kyrgyzstan: National Human Development Report. Bishkek: UNDP.

Vechernii Bishkek

2003 Bishkek, January 24, p. 1.

[Contents]

The Soviet Policy of Economic Nationalization in Uzbekistan and its Consequences, 1917-1940

Nadejda Ozerova, Senior Researcher at the Institute of History, Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Senior Lecturer at the Tashkent Financial Institute, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, nadejda29yandex.ru

This report presents preliminary findings of dissertation research started in 2000 at the Institute of History of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences. The research is funded in part by a Central Asia Research Initiative (CARI) grant designed to support the research and teaching interests of young faculty. This study aims to provide a comprehensive examination, through critical analysis and objective evaluation, of the Soviet policy towards private property and its owners in Uzbekistan in the period 1917-1940. The study also investigates the policy's consequences, especially its effect on the democratic rights of citizens. I pay particular attention to the relationship between authorities and private property ownership, and to the status of property owners in Turkestan (and from 1925, in Uzbekistan) in the first decades of Soviet rule.

Since independence Uzbekistan has been driven to reform its society. As part of the reform, economic liberalization has been designed to develop a class of private property owners by reducing the government's regulatory functions, providing more freedom to businesses, strengthening the private sector, and promoting small- and medium-size enterprises. The entirely opposite economic policy of 1917-1940 attracted the interest not only of historians, but also economists and other social scientists (Nepomnin 1957, Ul'masov 1960, Aminova 1963, Alimov 1974, Golovanov 1992). From 1917 to 1940, the Communist Party's positions on "class enemies," elimination of private property in the means of production, and creation of communal property determined Soviet economic policy. The implementation of this policy was possible only through the forcible alienation of the means of production from private property owners, and the eradication of the prosperous strata of society.

Favorable conditions for objective historical analysis and reevaluation of history emerged only after Uzbekistan's independence in 1991. Many previously closed archives were opened and scholars received access to the works of foreign researchers. Since independence many studies contributing to the formulation of an accurate history of Uzbekistan have been published (e.g., Golovanov 1992; Aminova 1993, 1995, 2000; Shamsutdinov 2001). However, my research is the first comprehensive study of economic "nationalization" in 1917-1940.

The commonly accepted methods of historical inquiry form the basis of my research, which is shaped by the concept of national independence with its preference for humanistic values. The research pays significant attention to archival materials from the Central State Archives of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the State Archives of Tashkent, the State Archives of Tashkent Province, and the State Archives of Samarqand Province. Brochures, decrees, and orders issued by the ruling authorities, as well as responses of various social groups in the form of letters, complaints, and direct actions have exceptional value. During archival work I traced private property owners' civil rights records. I am interested in determining how well the property owners' economic and other civil rights were observed.

Along with archival documents, I also studied published materials, such as monographs and multi-volume histories. I compared formerly unavailable archival documents with published materials using critical-analytical, comparative-historical, and logical methods of inquiry. I use three guiding principles. First, I use the principle of historicism, examining documents within their historical context. Second, I use the objectivity principle, which directs historians to examine the facts apart from a priori arguments or pre-established conceptions. I study both positive and negative sides of events independent of my personal attitude towards them. Third, I approach social history through the prism of individual and social interests, considering the motivations of each social group. I hold that such a multi-layered approach produces the best analysis by creating an accurate picture of events, examining consequences, and revealing the influences of policies on different strata of society and on individuals as well.

The most difficult task in carrying out this research is to deal with the discrepancies between the statistics reported in the archival documents and those in published materials. The discrepancies appeared due to pressure by the Soviet authorities to readjust statistics to fit predetermined schemes. In such cases, I assign priority to the archival documents, and proceed with their systematization and deep data analysis.

Research Findings

This research reveals that economic reforms in Turkestan began with the nationalization of factories and workshops. Following the metropole's interests, nationalization covered primarily industries associated with cotton. On February 26, 1918 the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom) of Turkestan issued a decree confiscating all cotton processing in the region, and pronouncing it the property of the workers-and-peasants' government. The decree also indicated that, "in case of resistance by owners, they should be subject to drastic measures right up to immediate execution by shooting." Following the cotton industry, the food oil industry was nationalized at the end of March 1918 through the same repressive method.

It should be noted that foreign entrepreneurs established a number of enterprises in Turkestan, such as the Belgian "Tashkent Tram" and the American "Singer Company." In December 1918, ignoring all the norms of international law, the Bolshevik government declared them nationalized. From 1917 to 1918, 330 enterprises of the leading industries in Turkestan were transferred into the hands of the Soviet authorities. By the end of 1919 more than 700 enterprises were nationalized.

During the nationalization process, Turkestani leaders did not take into account the interests of the peoples in the region, and did not consider the economic viability of their actions. After nationalization, the leadership failed to organize properly the operations of nationalized enterprises. An overwhelming majority of the nationalized enterprises, especially the cotton-cleaning factories, remained idle as they lacked raw materials, fuel, funding, personnel, and customers. The employees of these enterprises left their jobs en masse. The property of nationalized enterprises was stolen and damaged. As of January 1, 1921, the Central Council of the National Economy (CCNE) of Turkestan controlled 861 enterprises, including 405 that were not operational.

Nationalization failed to produce any clearly positive economic results. Instead, it led to a decline in production in a number of industries. In 1920 the total production output in the Turkestan region was 80% lower than in 1914. The general economic crisis in the Soviet Union, the worsening political situation, and fear of losing power forced the Bolsheviks to adopt the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1921. Some of the principal elements of NEP were replacement of the surplus-requisitioning system (prodrazverstka), i.e., forcible requisitioning of food products, by a tax in kind; legalization of commerce; private initiative in manufacturing, services and crafts; and partial restoration of market regulation mechanisms. In the countryside, following the transition to the tax in kind the government leadership tried to raise production through state-controlled land leasing, and by establishing production contracts with small farmers (dehqons). In some regions, these measures created stable conditions for farming. However, this "democratization" of the economy had a superficial and ambiguous character. Only the light- and small-scale processing industries grew, while benefit to small farms was artificially restrained. Furthermore, the political monopoly of the Bolshevik Party remained. The one-party dictatorship held the levers of the economy in one hand and free private business in the other hand, resulting in irreconcilable contradictions.

Despite positive results and economic stabilization, NEP was rejected because it threatened to break the monopoly and dictatorship of the one-party system. The Communist Party leadership viewed such an outcome as unacceptable. The breakdown of NEP at the end of the 1920s resulted in the full nationalization of agriculture and manufacturing. After NEP, Soviet economic policy called for rapid industrialization and forced collectivization. Its purpose was to eliminate the multi-structured economy, nationalize all forms of ownership, re-distribute property, and implement the principles of total egalitarianism. A war was waged against private property owners ending with the victory of the government. Under the state's monopoly on property ownership, people were moved further away from property ownership, product management, public production planning, profit distribution, and other key functions.

Previous studies examined various stages of Soviet economic policy in Central Asia, including War Communism (1918-1920), the New Economic Policy (1920s), and collectivization and industrialization (1930s) in isolation. This research is the first of its kind as it conducts a comprehensive examination of Soviet economic policy in Uzbekistan in the period 1917-1940. My intention is to close gaps in the historiography of Central Asia by revealing the mistakes of nationalization and its effects on different social strata. The individual is the main subject of my study. It was the fate of individuals who were successful entrepreneurs and farmers to suffer at the hands of the government and its ideology. A retrospective analysis of this controversial period allows me to identify the mistakes and obstacles on the path of economic reform, and I hope this will help my country to avoid them in the future.

References

Alimov, I.

1974 Uzbekskoe dekhkanstvo na puti k sotsializmu [Uzbek Dehqons on the Path to Socialism]. Tashkent: Uzbekistan.

Aminova, R. X.

1963 Agrarnaia politika sovetskoi vlasti v Uzbekistane (1917-1920) [Agricultural Policy of Soviet Power in Uzbekistan (1917-1920)]. Tashkent: Akademiia nauk Uzbekskoi SSR.

1993 Istoriia sovkhozov Uzbekistana, 1917-1960. Opyt, problemy, uroki [History of Sovkhozes of Uzbekistan, 1917-1960. Experience, Problems, Lessons]. Tashkent: Fan.

1995 Vozvrashchaias' k istorii kollektivizatsii v Uzbekistane [Returning to the History of Collectivization in Uzbekistan]. Tashkent: Fan.

2000 Turkestan v nachale XX veka: k istorii istokov natsional'noi nezavisimosti [Turkestan in the Early XXth Century: A History of the Origins of National Independence]. Tashkent: Fan.

Golovanov, A.

1992 Krest'ianstvo Uzbekistana: evoliutsiia sotsial'nogo polozheniia (1917-1937) [The Peasantry of Uzbekistan: Evolution of Social Status (1917-1937)]. Tashkent: Fan.

Nepomnin, V. Ia.

1957 Ocherki sotsialisticheskogo stroitel'stva v Uzbekistane [Studies in Socialist Construction in Uzbekistan]. Tashkent: Akademiia nauk Uzbekskoi SSR.

1960 Istoricheskii opyt stroitel'stva sotsializma v Uzbekistane [The Historical Experience of Constructing Socialism in Uzbekistan]. Tashkent: Gosizdat Uzbekskoi SSR.

Ul'masov, A.

1960 Natsionalizatsiia promyshlennosti v sovetskom Turkestane [Nationalization of Industry in Soviet Turkestan]. Tashkent: Akademiia nauk Uzbekskoi SSR.

Shamsutdinov, R.

2001 O'zbekistonda sovetlarning quloqlashtirish siyosati va uning fojeali oqibatlari [Soviet Policy of De-kulakization in Uzbekistan and Its Tragic Consequences]. Toshkent: Sharq.

[Contents]

Reviews and Abstracts

Anke von Kügelgen, Ashirbek Muminov, and Michael Kemper, eds., Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia, vol. 3: Arabic, Persian and Turkic Manuscripts (15th-19th Centuries). Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2000. Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, Band 233. ii + 571 pp., bibliography, index. ISBN 3879972869, €50.00.

Reviewed by: Devin DeWeese, Professor of Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind., USA, deweeseindiana.edu

Serious, historically-grounded research on the regions where Muslim civilization has intersected with Russian and Soviet power finds some of its best representatives today in German scholarship, unburdened by the gross imbalance regrettably imposed on Central Asian or "Central Eurasian" studies in the United States by the preponderance of support for (and hence the production of) scholarly work that is supposedly relevant for policymakers (with deleterious results for both scholarship and policy). German scholarship has yielded both impressive monographic studies and significant cooperative projects enlisting the work of some of the finest scholars from the former Soviet world. The volume under review is the final offering in a series of three collections of articles on previously under-explored aspects of Muslim culture in imperial Russia and Central Asia. The first two were published in 1996 and 1998, and focused more narrowly on the 18th to early 20th centuries. The third, like its predecessors, marks an important and substantial contribution to scholarship, and the three volumes together have opened up a host of new perspectives on the foundations of current developments in the Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union.

This volume includes ten contributions (eight in German, one in Russian, and one in English), of widely varying lengths, by an outstanding international group of scholars with a deep and direct knowledge of the Islamic manuscript traditions of Central Asia, the Volga-Ural region, and the North Caucasus. Most involve both the translation and edition (or facsimile publication), with extensive annotation and commentary, of previously unpublished and largely unstudied texts, in Arabic, Persian, and Turkic, and most have been brought to scholarly attention for the first time through this volume. The focus on manuscript sources is particularly important in view of the overwhelming concentration of much previous scholarship on "Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia" upon printed material. The use of printing was in general more attractive to the least traditional elements in Muslim societies, who were often the most unrepresentative of the interests, tastes, and aspirations of their communities (even if they claimed to be their spokesmen), and Western scholarship's emphasis on those who presented their Western-influenced ideas in Western-influenced media has inevitably yielded a skewed understanding of the real concerns of most Muslims under Russian rule, with unfortunate consequences that persist today. It may be said, indeed, that the neglect of the enormous body of material produced and surviving in manuscript form, from the Volga-Ural region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia lies at the heart of fundamental misunderstandings about Islam in those regions, both during the Soviet era and more recently, that have bedeviled the many "Sovietological" treatments of Islam in the Russian, Soviet, and post-Soviet environments.

The bulk of the volume is devoted to Central Asia, which is the focus of the first seven contributions, with the sixth presenting, in effect, a Volga-Ural perspective on Central Asia. In the first article, Jürgen Paul (Halle) edits and translates a brief discussion of the legitimacy of the vocal zikr, an issue central to Sufi practice and communal identity since the 13th century, with important political and social ramifications as well, composed by the eminent "theorist" of the Naqshbandi order, Khoja Muhammad Parsa (d. 822/1420). Next, Oleg F. Akimushkin (St. Petersburg) edits and translates a brief Persian treatise, by a 16th-century shaykh from a Central Asian Kubravi lineage, on the principles of mystical practice. Florian Schwarz (Bochum) presents a Persian poem on the Kubravi silsila, or "chain" of mystical transmission, by another 16th-century master, the son of Husayn Khwarazmi, the most important Kubravi shaykh of Central Asia in that era. These two contributions mark the first significant publications of texts produced within the Kubravi Sufi tradition in 16th-century Central Asia, and thus offer essential material for the larger project of understanding the religious history, and hence the religious present, of Central Asia.

The fourth contribution, by Baxtiyar M. Babazanov [Babajanov] (Tashkent), provides a well-annotated Russian translation of a remarkable Sufi treatise, in Chaghatay Turkic, written early in the 19th century in Khorezm. The only complete manuscript copy of the work, copied in 1925 and preserved in Tashkent, is reproduced in facsimile. Entitled Khalvat-i sufiha, the anonymous work was prompted by a ritual gathering of Sufis in Khiva in 1813 convened by Qutluq Murad Biy, the powerful amir and elder brother of Eltuzer (the first khan of the Khorezmian Qonghrat dynasty). The work offers unparalleled insights into the history of Sufi communities in Khorezm (on which considerable misinformation is still in circulation in Sovietological works).

Next, in the volume's longest contribution, Anke von Kügelgen (Bern) analyzes a series of letters written by an important Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi shaykh, Miyan Fail Ahmad, to the Manghit ruler of Bukhara, Amir Haydar (r. 1800-1825), on a wide range of religious issues; the contents are summarized, with some texts presented partly in paraphrase and partly in translations. Both the material itself and von Kügelgen's exemplary analysis will be invaluable for tracing the various "reformist" currents, and their political implications, that took shape in the Central Asian khanates well before the Western-inspired Jadidist movement made its appearance under Russian tutelage. A different perspective on the religious situation in the Khanate of Bukhara during the early 19th century is presented in the contribution of Michael Kemper (Bochum), which offers an edition and translation of an early Arabic work by the famous Volga-Ural Muslim scholar, Shihab ad-Din Marjani (d. 1889), focused on the religious disputes of the latter's compatriot, Abu Nasr al-Qursavi (d. 1812), with the ulama of Bukhara. This article adds to Kemper's earlier studies of Marjani's religious writings, which, taken together, have offered important correctives to our understanding of this figure's life and works, beyond the often one-dimensional presentations embedded in nationalist appropriations of his legacy.

In the seventh piece, Agirbek K. Muminov (Tashkent) edits and translates one of the many genealogical texts (nasab-nama) he and his colleagues have uncovered in recent years outlining the "sacred history" and familial traditions of the Khoja groups among the Qazaqs [Kazakhs] of the Syr Darya basin. The Khoja phenomenon is an important aspect of social and religious life throughout Central Asia, but remains poorly understood, and the term is still often the subject of a ludicrous confusion with hajji in the Sovietological literature. The version presented here is in Persian, and is preceded by an invaluable discussion of the corpus of such genealogical texts collected so far. Muminov's extensive notes to his translation likewise help make accessible the data from many other versions of these texts. The Volga-Ural region is represented in the contribution, in English, of Allen J. Frank (Maryland), who presents, in edition and translation, a substantial excerpt from an extraordinary work of "local history" preserved in a unique manuscript in Kazan. The work, entitled Tavarikh-i Alti Ata, was completed in 1910 by Muhammad-Fatih b. Ayyub al-Ilmini, and outlines a geographical and historical vision of a small part of the Volga-Ural Islamic community. Frank has also published a detailed study of this work's contents in his Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia, but this article is valuable for its presentation of extended portions of the text itself. The work represents the outlook, on the eve of the revolutionary changes in imperial Russia, of an educated Muslim who was neither unaffected by or resistant to the changes of that era, nor enamored of the responses to them shaped by Russian education and culture - for example, he writes of a Jadid school in his area closing for lack of interest (p. 462) - and whose understanding of his own community was self-confident enough to be self-critical. As such, it offers an excellent example of the kind of literary production that will be missed by those who assume that only printed material could be representative of significant written culture in this period, and of the kind of thought and worldview that is so often missed because of the inordinate attention in Sovietological and post-Soviet nationalist circles devoted to the handful of Jadidist reformers active in the same era.

Finally, two much shorter contributions represent the North Caucasus. First, Rukiya Sharafutdinova (St. Petersburg) edits and translates two Arabic letters (the first by the famous "Imam Shamil") from the 1830s; the letters reflect not only the struggles of this era between Russian troops and the local Muslim population, but internal tensions within the Muslim community as well. The final piece is a facsimile publication and translation by Aleksandra N. Kozlova (Makhachkala) of a 16th-century Persian document reflecting Safavid control over the principalities of southern Daghestan; it may serve as a reminder that Iranian interests in the regions of the "Russian borderlands" are not merely the product of the post-Soviet era.

The contributions are all of the highest scholarly quality, and the editors have done an excellent job of standardizing transliterations and references. The facsimiles are clear and legible, and both the printed Arabic-script texts and the Russian, German, and English texts are well produced, with relatively few typographical errors. It is worth underscoring here, finally, the value of the material presented in this volume for illuminating the vast world of Muslim culture as affected by Russian and Soviet rule, that remains hidden to readers more familiar with Soviet, Sovietological, nationalist, or policy-dominated studies of the relevant regions. It is hoped that such readers, instead of dismissing the volume's focus on manuscript sources as hopelessly arcane or being put off by its Arabic-script text and facsimiles, or ignoring it because it fails to deliver the concise platitudes on Islam that fill much existing work on the subject, will recognize that manuscript sources such as those explored in this volume are in fact the key repository of the traditions of Muslims in the regions in question' and often provide the only possible link between what came before the Soviet era's impact on Islam, and what has come to the fore since the end of Soviet antireligious campaigns. A dramatic improvement of our understanding of Islam in Central Asia and elsewhere in the former Soviet world is now especially urgent. The steady stream of superficial works on Islam in the Soviet and post-Soviet environments shows all too clearly that such improvement will not come from within the circles that have produced and consumed those works for several decades, but must come instead from the sort of work represented by the three fine volumes of Muslim Culture in Russia and Central Asia.

References

Frank, Allen J.

2001 Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780-1910. Leiden: Brill.

[Contents]

Daniel Brower, Turkestan and the Fate of the Russian Empire. London/New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 240 pp., illustrations. ISBN 0415297443 (cloth), $75.00.

Reviewed by: Gulnar Kendirbai, Fulbright Scholar, Harriman Institute, Columbia University, New York, USA, gk2020columbia.edu

This is a story about the failure of one colonial endeavor, namely the attempt by Tsarist Russia to incorporate its remote Asiatic colony, Turkestan, within its imperial structures. This story is framed by a second story dealing with the 1916 Revolt in Central Asia, which serves as both evidence and outcome of this failure. Russian Turkestan, the annexation of which began with the conquest of Tashkent in 1865 by General Cherniaev, was to become Russia's ambitious colonial project. Russian Turkestan covered the territory of the present Central Asian states (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan), as well as the southern part of Kazakhstan. First considered in terms of colonial expansion and domination, Turkestan was later to contribute to the creation of Russia's civilizing image, which would put Russia on a par with the Western colonial states. As an attractive immigration destination for Slavic land-hungry peasants and a successful cotton-growing colony, Turkestan also promised to facilitate the solution for Russia's domestic problems.

Brower traces the history of the creation of colonial Turkestan, which unfolds as he discusses the debates between central and local authorities that lasted until the end of the empire in 1917. He builds his narrative on a thorough analysis of archival material he collected at the Uzbek Central State Archives (Tashkent), the Military Historical Archives of the Russian Federation (Moscow) and the Russian State Historical Archives (St. Petersburg). Many of these valuable and until recently unknown documents demonstrate among other things the different legal statuses that the empire had assigned to its two Asiatic colonial bodies, Turkestan and the Steppe Territories (meaning most of present-day Kazakhstan). In this regard, the identification of Russian Turkestan with "Central Asia" confuses the terminology. For the latter term did not figure in this sense in Russia's imperial historiography, but has often been used in Western historiography to denote the territories of five former Soviet Republics: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.

As Brower presents it, the crux of the aforementioned debates centered on the organization of Turkestan's colonial administration. Those who based their arguments on the region's uniqueness, conditioned by the strong Islamic influence, advocated an authoritarian approach. Their opponents believed in the civilizing role of reforms and so favored an active interference into native structures, aimed at remolding them along imperial lines. The hard-liners in the end prevailed, or in the words of Brower, "authoritarian rule was permitted to take precedence over colonial reform" (p. 174), and Turkestan remained under military rule up to 1917. This debate had also another dimension: was Turkestan to be granted a special colonial status analogous with those overseas colonies of Britain and France, or was it to become a part of the Russian state? It was in this context that the reformers proposed the notion of grazhdanstvennost' (citizenship) as reflecting their vision of integration. Under the influence of Enlightenment ideas, colonial terminology had evolved from obrusenie (Russianization), meaning the imposition of Russian structures, toward the ideas of paternalism, progress and "the ideal of a shared citizenship for all subjects of the state, who were to enjoy rights and to fulfill certain obligations" (p. 174). The subsequent evolution of grazhdanstvennost' into gosudarstvennost' (statehood) under the Stolypin government (1906-1911) led to the mass immigration and settlement of Central Asia by Slavic peasants, which in the end provoked the outburst of the 1916 Revolt.

Here one can argue that the interference with native structures envisioned by the reformists like Girs, a member of the 1867 Steppe Commission, can also be regarded as authoritarian, for it stipulated their destruction. Moreover, the "integration through ethnic collaboration" advocated by another reform-minded official, Count Konstantin von Pahlen, had from the very outset an obviously utopian character, for these principles proved unrealizable in Russia itself. Hence, one remains puzzled over how the reformists intended to put their ideas into practice. A related question is, did all these debates and the ensuing legislation have any effect on the natives and their structures or did they remain only a colonial discourse "in the corridors of power" (p. xi)? Similarly, in the light of other data, the conquest of Turkestan seems to have been a doubtful rather than a straightforward colonial project dictated by central authoritarian rule. General Cherniaev's military campaign irritated even some higher government officials and left them puzzling over its possible implications (Geyer 1987 Kuleshov et al. 1997).

A closer examination of words in their relation to reality is more important as one takes into consideration that colonial policies were often conducted in Central Asia by administrative means and without any basis in law. This was particularly true for the resettlement policies, including the regulation of immigration, which had affected the nomads especially badly. These nomads would later be the main actors and victims of the 1916 Revolt. In the end they found themselves facing an unsolvable dilemma: either to settle on their own or lose their best grazing lands to settlers (pp. 126-151). Yet while the Central Asian nomads were deprived of their pasture lands by the 1868, 1886 and 1891 Tsarist statutes, Turkestan's native sedentary populations, contrary to Brower's assertions (p. 61), were granted their tilled lands by the 1886 Turkestan Statute. Only wild forests and the so-called "free" lands were to be considered the state's property. However, the natives could claim their right only after an approval by their local authorities based on a preliminary survey of their plots (Masevich 1960). It was precisely the execution of these land surveys (which also were to be carried out in nomadic areas to determine the amount of "excessive" lands) that became the tricky point of the whole issue. They were either never conducted, or when conducted their results proved useless or were not considered by local resettlement bureaucrats.

If the nomads and peasants were left to operate at their own discretion while settling their land conflicts, the Cossacks were granted legislative privileges, including financial and educational independence. They not only owned large portions of land in Semirechye (Zheti Su), which became a hotbed of the 1916 Revolt, they also actively participated in the revolt's suppression. These Cossacks also were involved in the conquest of other Central Asian territories, such as Khiva, Kokand, Merke, Pishpek, and Shïmkent. However, Brower barely mentions the Semirechye Cossacks and their land conflicts with the natives, peasants and central authorities.

Brower's portrayal of the important colonial figures, including N. A. Kryzhanovskii, Petr Semenov (Tian'-Shanskii), Aleksei Kuropatkin, Nil Lykoshin, and, especially the first Governor-General of Turkestan Konstantin von Kaufman, accompanied by the elucidation of their ideas, is the most valuable contribution of the book. The charismatic personality of Kaufman occupies a particular place in the confrontation between the conservatives and the reformists. Although in theory he adhered to reforms, as a governing official he saw clearly that insistence on Russian ways might provoke native protests. Instead he favored a policy of non-interference, because of the strong influence Islam wielded in Turkestan. Kaufman's emphasis on ethnographic knowledge to provide the necessary tools for a more active approach to Islamic cultural structures in the future formed therefore an indispensable part of his policy of ignoring Islam. Hence, his stance toward Islam should be regarded first of all as pragmatic, like that of Catherine II, who promoted religious toleration. In contrast to Kaufman, however, the Empress regarded the establishment of control over Islam by means of its bureaucratization as the most effective way to govern her Muslim subordinates. Elsewhere she initiated the establishment of state-controlled Islamic institutions, with their clergy paid by the state and fully subordinated to it. Thanks to his authority, Kaufman was able to realize his religious policies in Turkestan, while the religious policies of Catherine II were considerably revised in other Islamic regions of the empire.

Kaufman's policies of disregarding Islam did not disturb one "private domain of Islamic piety" (p. 33), namely the pilgrimage to Mecca. The section "Resurgent Popular Islam" (pp. 114-125) describing the pilgrimage's history, constitutes one of the most informative and interesting parts of the book. Yet, the impact of Kaufman's policies on other aspects of Islamic life, especially the Islamic leadership, remains somewhat vague. As the description of the 1898 Andijan Revolt led by the Sufi leader Madali Ishan hints, Kaufman's restrictive measures against the urban Islamic clergy seem to have reactivated their rural colleagues represented by the Sufis. For their part, the clergy reemerged in the form of the powerful conservative Islamic organization Shura-i-Ulama which played an important role in the political events between the two 1917 revolutions in Turkestan. As this suggests, a closer investigation than Brower provides of the participation of both groups of Islamic leadership in the 1916 Revolt could lead to a better understanding of the impact of imperial policies. One impact was that Central Asian Muslims repeatedly expressed a desire to have separate religious boards for Turkestan and the steppe provinces, noting this in petitions sent to central authorities in the period following the 1905 Revolution. Although vacillating at times, the government's position, under the alleged threat of pan-Islamic propaganda, finally shifted from reluctant to restrictive modes.

Brower also neglects the impact of imperial policies on the emergence of another group of native leaders, the Russian/Western-oriented non-Jadid intelligentsia. He limits himself to mentioning only one of them, the Kazakh engineer, Mukhametjan Tynyshbaev, the future first president of the Turkestan (Kokand) Autonomous State. Apart from Tynyshbaev, we learn about one native businessman and a merchant who unsuccessfully tried to adopt Russian ways, but unfortunately nothing about Mustafa Shoqai [Chokaev], Turar Rïsqulov [Ryskulov], Sanjar Aspandiiar, Sultanbek Kojanov, Sherali Lapin, and other distinctive natives, whose participation in the political events preceding the establishment of Bolshevik power in Central Asia was in many ways determined by their colonial educational background. One small inaccuracy in the chapter dealing with educational reform needs also be pointed to, namely the fact that not the Kazakh, but the Tatar language, was used by colonial bureaucrats in Kazakh business correspondence (p. 71). These critical remarks, however, are not intended to diminish the value of Brower's book. They rather prove that an original study always prompts not only diverse opinion but also fresh ideas that might inspire new investigations.

References

Geyer, Dietrich

1987 Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860-1914. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Khalid, Adeeb

1998 The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Masevich, Margarita G., ed.

1960 Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana (so vremeni prisoedineniia Kazakhstana k Rossii do Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi Sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii) [Materials on the History of the Political Construction of Kazakhstan (From the Time of Unification of Kazakhstan to Russia to the Great October Socialist Revolution)]. Alma-Ata: Akademiia nauk Kazakhskoi SSR.

Kuleshov, Sergei, et al.

1997 Natsional'naia politika Rossii: istoriia i sovremennost' [Russian Nationalities Policy: History and Present]. Moskva: Russkii Mir.

[Contents]

Pauline Jones Luong, Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. xxi + 321 pp., map, tables, illustrations, bibliography, index. ISBN 0521801095, $60.00.

Reviewed by: Cengiz Surucu, Research Assistant, Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, surucumetu.edu.tr

This work is a study of institution-building in post-Soviet Central Asia. Specifically, Jones Luong presents a detailed and neatly-formulated frame through which electoral systems in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were negotiated and adopted. The author focuses on the disparities among the electoral systems of the three countries and formulates her research question as "Why did three states with similar cultural, historical and structural legacies establish such different electoral systems?" (p. 25).

Jones Luong's answer to this question is an innovative synthesis of two broad schools of thought in the study of regime change and political transitions, namely what Herbert Kitschelt once called process (or agent) oriented "transitions" literature and the preconditions school of regime change (Kitschelt 1992). Agent-oriented or voluntarist studies focus on the transition process itself and place more emphasis on the transformative capacity of human agency, while the preconditions school, in its various versions, associates particular historical configurations of structural or cultural variables with variation among regimes. Jones Luong combines theoretical insights from Historical Institutionalism (HI) and Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI), using HI to identify the structural/historical background which determines the initial conditions, such as who are the relevant actors, their preferences and the preexisting power asymmetries (pp. 38-39). In the transitional context, Jones Luong relies on RCI to account for the "the degree to and direction in which the initial parameters shift or change ... in response to new opportunities or constraints presented by the situation" (p. 26). She develops what she calls a "transitional bargaining game (TBG) in which the dynamic interaction between the structural-historical context and the immediate strategic context directly shapes actors' perceptions of shifts in their relative power as the game proceeds, and hence, their bargaining strategies" (p. 25). Institutions, the author argues, are created by actors who seek distributional advantages under conditions of asymmetrical power distribution. According to her model, Soviet institutions molded regionalism as the overarching identity and thus provided the actors (regional and central leaders) with clear preferences: to maintain or increase their power in relation to others. To the degree that the transitional context deals an exogenous shock to the system, antecedent conditions change, and so do actors' perceptions of power distribution in the system and their bargaining strategies.

In Chapter 3, Jones Luong engages in lengthy discussions to prove that the Soviet Union left identical historical legacies in these three Central Asian states ‑ which she needs as evidence for the Historical Institutionalist component of her study that regionalism, and only regionalism, shapes the parameters of politics in the region. In what will surely become her most controversial claim, she asserts that "Soviet policies and institutions in Central Asia created, transformed and institutionalized regional political identities, while at the same time eliminating tribal, religious, and national identities, weakening them, or confining them to the social and cultural spheres" (p. 52). Regionalism in her usage corresponds to the Soviet administrative-territorial units. She employs a highly functionalist view of identities when she argues that identities serve to connect institutional legacies to actors' preferences; "identities which I characterize as an investment that individuals make in response to structural incentives, will persist as long as they continue to yield the benefits for which they were initially adopted" (p. 48). Accordingly, in Central Asia, Soviet policies and institutions transformed pre-Soviet identities with a complex set of incentives and disincentives so that individuals' primary source of identification has become their region (p. 53).

As the structural-historical background delineated the predominant fault lines in the region, the ongoing transitions opened a window of opportunity for renegotiation and change. That is what the author details in Chapter 4. Transitions bring uncertainty into the environment, alter the existing power distribution and thus feed the desire for change. With the post-Soviet transitions, according to Jones Luong, Central Asian republics started to differ from each other. Relatively comprehensive, rapid reformation in Kyrgyzstan altered the perception of power distribution in favor of regional leaders, while centralized, modest political and economic reforms in Uzbekistan enhanced the power of central leaders. Kazakhstani transitions, representing a case somewhere in between the other two, boosted the perceptions of increasing power among both regional and central leaders (p. 103).

In Chapters 5 through 7, Jones Luong applies her theory to her empirical data in order to explain the variation in the electoral outcomes induced by the perceptions of shifts in relative power. In Kyrgyzstan, because of a relatively rapid and comprehensive reform process, regional leaders exerted the greatest impact on election outcomes. Uzbekistan represented the exact opposite, as the central leaders almost unilaterally imposed the terms of the new electoral system. In Kazakhstan, the "mixed" case, the irregularity of the reform process gave similar signals to both central and regional leaders that power was increasing in comparison with the other side. As a result, the first and defunct electoral law of December 1993 was followed by a constitutional crisis, and a new law was adopted in September 1995 after a second round of negotiations (p. 215). Unlike the first law, which was a victory for the central leaders, the 1995 law incorporated interests of the regional actors. The Kazakhstani case was also different in that in addition to regionalism, ethnicity played a crucial role in the preference formation process. Jones Luong's discussion of the cases reveals that the preferences of the actors were not uniform across cases. To give an example, central leaders in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan wanted the registered parties to nominate candidates, while regional leaders completely opposed this proposal and favored the Soviet era practice, in which local workers' collectives and residential committees had the right of nomination (pp. 167, 200). In contrast, in Kazakhstan both central and regional leaders resisted party nomination; central leaders preferred self-nomination, the Supreme Soviet favored the Soviet era practice, and regional leaders wanted the right to be granted to regional akims (p. 228).

In the last chapter, Jones Luong situates her research in the larger context of debates over political transitions and institutional change. Institutional residues of the ancient regime, according to Jones Luong, were expected to be substantive because of what is called "pacted-stability," where established elites survived to the new era and preserved the existing institutional setting which endowed them with significant power (p. 278). Unlike other Central Asian countries, Tajikistan, she argues, failed to resolve "political battles" "through balancing regional and central interests" because of the emergence of a strong alternative elite who failed to come to terms with the "regional power-sharing system institutionalized under Soviet rule" (p. 274).

The scope of Pauline Jones Luong's book goes far beyond her three cases. She not only methodically brings the "transitology" literature into Central Asian studies, but also carries Central Asian cases to the larger comparativist community. In so doing, she aims to overcome the widely-discussed poverty of transitology literature by applying theoretical insights from other disciplines. In general, comparativists have become too dismissive of a thorough area expertise, while "area specialists" tend to be too focused to engage with the larger world (Bates 1997). Jones Luong's study demonstrates how rewarding, and arduous, it can be to strike a balance between them.

Yet Jones Luong's reduction of Soviet legacies into unidimensional and highly functionalist regionalism obscures much of what exists on the ground, regardless of comparativists' concern for abstract modeling. She overstates her case when she asserts that regionalism "emerged as the most salient socio-political cleavage in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan" (p. 63). She treats identities as structured, hierarchized and stable categories, some of which inhabit the privileged sphere of politics, and some of which do not. Identities are not such neatly demarcated and exclusionary categories in the minds of those who hold them. Our subjects are not trained comparativists and they have every right to be nonconformist. Jones Luong herself concedes that "similar to press accounts, interviewees often used the word tribalism to convey regionalism" (p. 179, n 53). Identities are highly contextual; there are many instances in which tribe, ethnicity, or religion become politically as significant as regional identity. There is little reason to think that the Soviet-endowed oblast' [province] identity made the struggle between Dulats and Kongrats of Shïmkent politically less relevant. A Dulat representative negotiates the new electoral law not only in terms of its implications for the Shïmkent Province, but also in terms of its impact on the existing power configuration between Kongrat and Dulat voters in the region. We now have ample evidence that the Soviet state itself institutionalized tribal identities, informally integrating them into its governing structures at every level. The infamous "tribal map" of Kazakhstan lying unfolded on the desk of the second secretary of Communist Party of Kazakhstan was an open secret in Almaty.

References

Kitschelt, Herbert

1992 "Political regime change: structure and process-driven explanations?" American Political Science Review, 86 (4) 1028-1034.

Bates, H. Robert

1997 "Area studies and the discipline: a useful controversy???" PS: Political Science and Politics, 30 (2) 166-169.

[Contents]

Boris Z. Rumer, ed., Central Asia and the New Global Economy. Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2000. xiii + 288 pp., illustrations, map. ISBN 0765606291, $74.95.

Reviewed by: Peter G. Laurens, Sovereign and Corporate Risk Analysis, Emerging Markets Fixed Income, FH International Financial Services, Inc. Carlson Investment Management, LLC, plaurensfhinternational.com

This is the third in a series of books on the Central Asian states since independence, edited primarily by Boris Rumer of Harvard University's Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. Either by accident or design, this collection of eight essays on the economies of the region is suffused with an explicit pessimism that stems from the monumental difficulties each country faces by having to "go it alone." Chief among the difficulties are: the legacy of the Soviet command economy, which has left the new states' governing elites unprepared for globalization and unwilling to loosen the reins of power; the region's geographical isolation, which creates serious obstacles to trade; and the impoverishment of much of the rapidly growing population, which makes unlikely a recovery driven by domestic consumer demand.

Collectively, the eight cogent, clearly-written essays argue that it will be extremely difficult for the Central Asian states to even recapture the level of economic development they had before independence. The dismantling of the command economy at independence led to a catastrophic collapse in per capita GDP among all the new states, yet a new model for sustainable development has not come into being. Stanislav Zhukov, a senior research associate of the Russian Academy of Sciences and contributor of four of the essays, correctly emphasizes that aside from Kazakhstan the Central Asian economies are primarily agrarian. None of the Central Asian states has, however, paid more than lip service towards observing what Zhukov terms "the iron laws of development," which hold that balanced growth in an economy overall must be based on growth in productivity in the agrarian sector, preferably driven by private farms.

Instead, Zhukov sees "controlled degradation" as the most appropriate characterization of the region's economic prospects over the medium term. In such a scenario one can imagine Central Asia in the aggregate resembling Algeria: the state controls the exploitation of commodity resources and may apply the revenues to subsidize economic activity and forestall social unrest; the economy remains vulnerable to changes in world commodity prices; agriculture remains underdeveloped and private enterprise is of minimal importance to economic growth. Among Central Asian economies, Kazakhstan alone has posted robust GDP growth (9.5% in 2002) without submitting to the "iron laws"; unsurprisingly, this growth is driven mainly by its hydrocarbon exports.

If balanced growth based on the heavy promotion of an independent private agrarian sector is not on the agenda in Central Asia, then growth will have to come from massive promotion of raw material exports. In their essays on the development of trade and markets, Eskender and Eshref Trushin, research economists in Uzbekistan, note the importance of prioritizing structural reforms for agricultural exports, especially in those countries that cannot rely on the exporting of minerals. They maintain, however, that "not a single country of Central Asia has yet made export orientation the strategic basis for development" (p. 139). This holds true for most of the region, but less so for Kazakhstan, which has actively pushed development of its hydrocarbon exports.

Oksana Reznikova, like Zhukov a senior researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences, offers perhaps the sole note of optimism in the book. She postulates a new "Silk Route" for the 21st century, feasible only if each of the Central Asian nations succeeds in developing its comparative advantage in trade with China and the rest of the Asian-Pacific region. The problem is that a comparative advantage can be maintained only if exporters are efficient enough to adapt to price changes in markets with freely convertible currencies. Such production efficiencies will be hard to achieve in agriculture without massive investment and privatization.

In sum, Central Asia and the New Global Economy offers a sobering look at the prospects for sustained and equitable development of the region's economies. The reader is left to ponder: how can these nations possibly dig themselves out of their economic morass? One would do well to remember that nowadays no economy is completely immune to the consequences of exogenous trends. To a degree not foreseen when the book went to press, the underlying themes of the book - the commodity-based structure of the Central Asian economies and the growing restlessness of the region's populations - will continue to attract the world's attention because of two extremely important developments in world politics and economics.

First among these developments is the emerging counterterrorism strategy of the United States, which seeks to reduce dependence on the Middle East as a source of energy, and to provide preemptive economic and political support to states deemed to be in danger of collapse and vulnerable to terrorist infiltration. Such support would most likely take the form of financial aid, supplied on very generous terms by agencies affiliated with or heavily influenced by the US government, such as USEXIM, USAID and the IMF. This is analogous to the politically-driven generosity of the United States towards nearly-bankrupt Pakistan in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on US soil. The United States rescheduled its portion of $12.5 billion of loans made by the Paris Club of donors to Pakistan, wrote off $1 billion of its $3 billion in bilateral official debt with that nation and early in 2004 resolved to cancel another $460 million. Because of political expediency the United States has deemed Pakistan "too important to default." In the event a strategically important Central Asian state finds itself in serious financial distress, such US financial largesse may be its reward if its leaders play their political cards right.

The second development is the emergence of China as one of the world's leading economic powers and consumers of raw materials. As it grows it is likely to turn more towards commodity-producing Central Asia, whose commerce with China may come to dwarf its trade with any other of its export markets.

It is indeed possible that a decade from now the region's economies will still be characterized by "controlled degradation." Nevertheless, the book's gloomier, more dramatic predictions, such as mass starvation (p. 273), may be proven wrong by both these geopolitical and economic sea changes, which may yet turn out to be Central Asia's economic salvation.

[Contents]

Roald Sagdeev and Susan Eisenhower, eds., Islam and Central Asia: An Enduring Legacy or an Evolving Threat? Washington, D.C.: Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2000. 255 pp. ISBN 0967023327, $22.00.

Reviewed by: Vika Gardner, PhD Candidate, Department of Near Eastern Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., USA, vikaumich.edu

This text, which predates the events of September 11, 2001, was prepared, as the introduction notes, as a tool for "opinion leaders" and other users (as opposed to producers) of information. It is the result of a conference in Bishkek in 1999, and as such may be of greatest interest to those who wish to learn how Islam was construed at that moment in time. For this purpose the text is very useful.

For anyone who has tried to present Islam in Central Eurasia to high school students and undergraduates, the dearth of English-language materials giving students access to primary sources about contemporary Central Eurasians' experience of Islam does not need to be explained. Only a few works like those of the Shirket Gah collective (Tokhtakhodjaeva and Turgumbekova 1996) compile a number of voices and perspectives from Central Eurasians themselves. This is not to say that Western scholars' work is not important, but that giving our students direct access to alternative voices is a first step in helping them understand the diversity that is Islam.

The articles here voice quite well the variations of understanding across the Central Eurasian republics. Most of them begin with a context for their remarks, and the authors usually provide a history of Islam in their region or republic. The book consists of several major sections. The first, "Central Asia and Islam from Within," includes an overview article by Roald Sagdeev and articles on Islam in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan by Anara Tabyshalieva, Abdumannob Polat, Saodat Olimova and Roustem Safronov, respectively. The section "Russia and Central Asia: the Interconnections," features articles by Archbishop Vladimir of the Orthodox Diocese of Bishkek and All Central Asia concerning "similarities" between Islam and Christianity, Marat Murtazin on Muslims in Russia, and Victor Panin on the North Caucasus. The final section, "Central Asia and Outside Influences," presents chapters by Aleksei Malashenko on Russian relations with Central Asia, Shireen T. Hunter on Iran and the post-independence communications flow concerning Islam in Central Asia, M. Hakan Yavuz on Turkey's political relationships with Central Asia, and Ahmed Rashid on Afghanistan's and Pakistan's relations with Central Asia concerning Islam.

The two most successful articles are those of Hunter and Rashid. Hunter discusses the influence and non-influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Shi'ism; balanced and careful, she does not fall into the label-ridden polemical tactics found in many of the other articles. Rashid, by placing in context the political influences on Central Asia from Afghanistan and Pakistan, likewise presents a political sphere full of complications; he points out some of the instances in which governments have manipulated the image of Islam while discussing government support of militarized radicalism. These articles would surely provide a solid base for those whose policy decisions one might want to inform.

Policy might have been informed as well by contrasting different authors' ideas. For example, Yavuz, whose article describes the various attitudes the Turkish government has struck vis-à-vis the governments of the Central Asian republics, presents Islam as an "ethnocultural" force to be utilized as Turkey attempts to move beyond its "big brother" political aspirations toward "normalization." This contrasts sharply with Panin's vision of Islam reinvigorated in the Caucasus by outside forces, including some from Turkey in Chechnya. An index would have made an enormous difference in the imagined end users' ability to compare and contrast these kinds of ideas. Is Turkey acting as a secular state in promoting a certain kind of Islam?

Someone looking to compile "facts" about earlier Islamic history in Central Eurasia will find little of interest here. Unfortunately, the "facts," most often presented without any discussion, sometimes include errors: "[The] Yesiviyye became the intellectual origins of the Naksibendiyye [sic] and Bektasiyya [sic] ... Thus Yesevi and his vernacularized understanding of Islam has been the dominant form of Islam in the Turkic world," (Yavuz, pp. 204-205). Naqshbandis in almost any era would find this a wrong-headed statement, given Yasavi's subsidiary role in the order and the two groups' apparent competition during the Naqshbandiya's formative stages in Central Eurasia. At the same time, this emphasis on Yasavi is an indicator of a pattern of thought that is prominent in circles where there is a desire to emphasize the Turkic over the Persianate (Schubel 1999). This is but one of many interpretive quandaries that an "objective" reader might have with the text. Sufism in general is stereotyped nearly as much as "Wahhabis" are, although there are cautionary notes in two separate articles (Hunter, p. 175; Rashid, p. 220). While there are many scholars with far more complicated understandings of these issues, their voices are not heard here.

There is a great deal of useful information to be gleaned from this text. Abdumannob Polat, who has published elsewhere in English about dissent in Uzbekistan, gives us more data concerning the interactions between the government and dissenting voices in Uzbekistan which aids understanding of the motivations and complexities of dissent in Central Eurasia. The many "histories" at the beginning of articles allow us to see Islam through the lens of those trained largely during the Soviet era, as in the contribution by Roustem Safronov. Both Polat's and Safronov's successes lie in their descriptions of Uzbekistan's and Turkmenistan's manipulation of Islamicate images (and imaginings) to the benefit of those in government.

Archbishop Vladimir's nationalist agenda is clear when he links Great Russian nationalism with Orthodoxy in the same way he sees Islam linked to the titular nationalities' nationalisms in Central Asia. His claim that "Islam has much more Christianity to it than many other denominations that claim to be Christian" (p. 98) will probably come as a surprise to many a Christian and Muslim; that it honors a "let's get along" program is commendable. Yet a tendentious mindset is visible in many articles, such as that of Archbishop Vladimir, who apparently does not view any "Slavs" as being "native" to Central Eurasia (p. 97). Marat Murtazin, whose article attempts to cover Muslims in Russia from the ninth century onward, presents his own impressions of life in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and cites no sources. He also blames what might be termed "activism" in southern Russia and Tajikistan on "Islamic missionaries" (p. 128) and their literature, from which he argues for government protection, although to his credit, he mentions that "not all foreign Islamic organizations are responsible for subversive activity" (p. 129). Only after two pages of trying to show a "history" of "Wahhabism" does he mention that "Wahhabi" is used to "denounce any Islamic leader - or any Muslim" (p. 130). He stereotypes Russians as unable to think for themselves (p. 131), and as people who view "anyone who professes Islam" automatically as an enemy, while on the same page he says that "Muslims in Russia should be satisfied with the present state of religious freedom," a statement that unwittingly echoes certain American statements about African-Americans during struggles over civil rights. Yet the utility of statements like these in the classroom can be immense.

One can only hope that the "opinion leaders" towards whom this text is directed will find more complex images of Islam, Sufism and "Wahhabis" than they might find here. Given the lack of an index, or even page numbers in the Table of Contents, however, they would need to read the entire work to find the breadth of the discussion. Old saws about "survivals" from non-Islamic religions, "popular Islam," and Sufism's opposition to and by "religious scholars" are reflexively called upon as tropes. For correctives, DeWeese presents complex views of "survivals," (DeWeese 2000), as do Knysh on Wahhabis (Knysh 2002, 2004) and Gross on "popular" Islam (Gross 1999). DeWeese's work also explores how Soviet constructions of Islam have shaped even Western scholarship (DeWeese 2002). Thus, while this text is probably not useful for the readers that its editors had in mind, it is not completely without utility. We all need the flow of information to and from Central Eurasia to increase, and this text's facilitation of that flow must, in the end, be applauded.

References

DeWeese, Devin

2000 "Dog saints and dog shrines in Kubravî tradition: notes on a hagiographical motif from Khwârazm," In: Miracle et Karâma: Hagiographie médiévales comparées. D. Aigle, ed., pp. 459-497. Turnhout: Brepols.

2002. "Islam and the legacy of Sovietology: a review essay on Yaacov Ro'i's Islam in the Soviet Union," Journal of Islamic Studies, 13 (3) 298-330.

Gross, Jo-Ann

1999 "The polemic of 'official' and 'unofficial' Islam: Sufism in Soviet Central Asia." In: Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics. F. de Jong and B. Radtke, eds., pp. 520-540. Leiden: Brill.

Knysh, Alexander

2002 "Sufism as an explanatory paradigm: the issue of the motivations of Sufi resistance movements in Western and Russian scholarship," Die Welt des Islams, 42 (2) 139-173.

2004 "Clear and present danger: Wahhabism as rhetorical foil," Die Welt des Islams, 44 (1) 1-26.

Polat, Abdumannob

1999 "Can Uzbekistan build democracy and civil society?" In: Civil Society in Central Asia. M. H. Ruffin and D. Waugh, eds., pp. 135-157. Seattle, Wash.: Center for Civil Society International.

Schubel, Vernon J.

1999 "Post-Soviet hagiography and the reconstruction of the Naqshbandî tradition in contemporary Uzbekistan," In: Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia: Change and Continuity. E. Özdalga, ed., pp. 73-87. Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul.

Tokhtakhodjaeva, M., and E. Turgumbekova

1996 Daughters of Amazons: Voices from Central Asia. Translated by S. Aslam, ed. by C. Balchin. Lahore: Shirket Gah Women's Resource Centre.

[Contents]

Yuri Bregel, An Historical Atlas of Central Asia. Leiden: Brill, 2003. xi + 110 pp., preface, 49 maps, bibliographical notes, index. ISBN 9004123210, €134 / $181.

Reviewed by: Nick Megoran, Research Fellow, Department of Geography, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK, nwm20cam.ac.uk

The division of the world into regions is a matter of custom, but in order to become imprinted on popular geographical imaginations, regions must be identifiable in the abstraction of cartographic representation. Central Asia has not consistently been considered as a single region. In many historical atlases, Central Asia is, literally, at the margin of maps focused on Russia, China, Europe, South Asia, or the Middle East, or is portrayed as an ephemeral space over which trade, migrations and invasions pass between genuinely important places. It is this gap that Bregel seeks to fill in publishing his Historical Atlas of Central Asia. The atlas' core concern is the portrayal of the historical political geography of Central Asia - the territory and ethnicity of nomadic and sedentary polities and their boundaries, along with significant military campaigns and battles.

The atlas consists of 49 maps on high-quality, large format color plates. "Central Asia" is defined as that area from the Caspian Sea in the west to Lake Lop-Nor in the east, and from the Hindu-Kush mountains in the south to the limits of the Steppe Belt in the north. The majority of the maps are projected onto this same template. The first map having set the scene with a useful depiction of the physical geography, the remaining maps illustrate the unfolding political history from the time of Alexander to the present day, with approximately one quarter of the maps covering the last two centuries. There are also maps showing archaeological sites, Islamic monuments, and city plans. Most maps have up to one page of corresponding explanatory text, providing a narrative of the period and flagging significant areas of scholarly disagreement.

The use of a consistent template allows the reader to turn the atlas on its side and, concentrating on one area, to flip across the centuries and see under whose rule it came. Taken with the text, this book gives both an admirably concise overview of Central Asian history and a good impression of the complexity and fluidity of political control. This is aided by the beautiful presentation throughout. Each map is well referenced, and the addition of a comprehensive index makes it an extremely useful reference source. Bregel both achieves and surpasses his stated aim.

In his landmark study of the genre, Black argues convincingly that historical atlases do more than present objective, historical facts: they are subjective visions of history, revealing what historians consider important to include or omit (Black 1997). In the light of this work, four comments can be made on Bregel's atlas.

Firstly, an explicit goal of this book is to construct a specific vision of what "Central Asia" is, historically and geographically. The region is not seen as marginal to European or other Asian empires and interests, but as an entity in its own right: the setting of maps in a double-bounded frame further serves to emphasize this. Recentering this history is vital to the processes of scholarly and political decolonization, but the reader is left wondering how Central Asia was located in wider continental and global developments; the use of larger-scale inset maps would have been of assistance here. The atlas impinges upon debates about both naming and delimiting the legitimate area of study, and may prove controversial to those who prefer to conceive of a wider geographical field such as "Central Eurasia," "Inner Asia," or "Central Asia and the Caucasus."

Secondly, the relevance of the traditional agenda of historical atlases - clearly demarcated territorial control - is questionable for Central Asian pre-colonial history. Indeed, as Bregel's text would suggest, the personal authority of the ruler or the ability to enforce tributary payment may be more useful indicators of power. Standard maps depicting bounded territorial units differentiated in bold colors, suggesting universal and stable control over all the territory, can therefore be misleading. Bregel wrestles with these questions, laboring to resist the Eurocentric temptation to over-emphasize powerful states at the expense of the complex and varied political nature of Central Asian history, for example, by using dotted lines to depict frontiers and by eschewing the use of shading until the late nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the atlas leaves many unanswered questions about the imposition of modern cartographic notions of power and spatiality on historical Central Asian conceptions of space.

Thirdly, the choice of topics in the atlas reveals little sensitivity to what Black (Chapter 9) identified as the post-1945 "New Agenda" of historical atlases, that of balancing the depiction of political geographic history with cultural, social and other histories. While a handful of maps present overviews of archaeological sites, tribal distributions, trade routes and town plans, the logic of the atlas remains overwhelmingly political-geographic, narrating the history of Central Asia as the territorial struggles of powerful males and their armies. This is a missed opportunity. The growing literature on Central Asia surely provides ample material to map alternative histories, including women's incorporation into the Soviet state, cotton and agricultural production, wealth and poverty, literacy, and environmental change.

Finally, Bregel concludes with a map of Central Asia in the year 2000, highlighting the five former Soviet states with bold colors and firmly drawn boundaries - the only map in the collection that employs this dramatic cartographic technique. This implies that the dynamism of tribal and regional identities and of complicated competing rivalries within polities has finally been overcome in independence, and that boundaries between nations can at last be drawn unambiguously and unproblematically. This is far from the case, and it is a pity that Bregel belatedly draws on this paradigm when so many other examples of mapping contemporary political complexity and dynamism in other parts of the world are available.

These concerns should not detract from Bregel's achievement. The Atlas is an elegantly crafted work that breaks new ground in the study of the historical political geography of Central Asia. It is to be recommended to the general reader and the specialist alike.

References

Black, Jeremy

1997 Maps and History: Constructing Images of the Past. New Haven: Yale University Press.

[Contents]

George Kennan, Vagabond Life: The Caucasus Journals of George Kennan, edited by Frith Maier. Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 2003. xvi + 266 pp., maps, introduction, appendix, afterword, bibliography, index. ISBN 0295982500, $30.00.

Reviewed by: Thomas M. Barrett, Associate Professor, Department of History St. Mary's College of Maryland, USA, tmbarrettsmcm.edu

Vagabond Life makes available for the first time George F. Kennan's journal of his 1870 trip across Daghestan, Chechnya, Ossetia, and Georgia. Kennan's terse and for the most part unenlightening comments are supplemented with extracts from his letters, manuscripts, and four of his magazine and journal articles on the Caucasus.

The journal entries themselves are maddening to read, since Kennan rarely wrote in complete sentences. Aside from the occasional interesting observation about local dress, food, customs, or customary law, much of his writing focuses on landscapes, buildings, and the challenges of travel.

One also has to wonder, as the editor does in her introduction, how much Kennan really understood. He knew no Caucasian languages and had to rely mostly on his Russian, which seems to have been sketchy. As he admitted in his unpublished autobiography, "The knowledge that I had of it when I returned from Siberia was very imperfect and inadequate, and had been gained, almost wholly, by listening to the talk of Cossack and Kamchadal dog-drivers by the camp-fire... I did not even know the Russian alphabet, and it was weeks after my arrival in St. Petersburg before I could find a word in a dictionary or give more than a guess at the proper way to spell it" (pp. 21-22). Luckily for Kennan, he joined up with a travel companion, Prince G. D. Jorjadze, who served as a translator and cultural interpreter for much of his journey. Once Kennan departed from him, the journal entries became revealingly brief and descriptive until he picked up another guide and interpreter, an Avar by the name of Akhmet. For example, the only thing he wrote about Tbilisi, after parting ways with the prince but before working with Akhmet, was his fight there with officials to secure horses for the next stage of his journey. The fact that Kennan wrote so little about Tbilisi and Grozny and nothing about Vladikavkaz reflects his predictable romantic and orientalist leanings - better to describe an exotic hat, a colorful blood feud, or a supposed relic of the Crusaders than a town center where he presumably would have been able to find ample help translating and explaining.

For whom was this book published? There is really nothing of interest here to scholars, and the awkwardness of the format will put off general readers. The most interesting parts are Kennan's articles, which are cut up and interspersed throughout the book, and the editor's introduction, which provides a useful sketch (for the general reader) of Kennan's life and career and the history of the Caucasus. Indeed one gets the sense that the editor needed to supplement the journal to provide a rationale for publication. Remove the extra materials and the parts of the journal before and after Kennan arrives in the Caucasus and we are left with no more than 71 pages of journal. But the journal entries cast doubt on the veracity of the articles - either he had a photographic memory or he elaborated, sometimes to the point of fabrication. At the end, the reader feels like Kennan after a hard day's journey up and down the mountain slopes - weary and (although he rarely admitted it) a bit confused.

[Contents]

Conferences and Lecture Series

The Tenth Annual Central and Inner Asian Seminar

University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada, April 16-17, 2004

Reported by: Jennifer Taynen, Asian Institute, University of Toronto, Canada, jennifer.taynenutoronto.ca

The University of Toronto's Tenth Annual Central and Inner Asian Seminar, titled The Domestic Environment of Central and Inner Asia, attracted an impressive array of delegates who used the theme of domestic environment as a jumping off point from which to discuss a wide range of political, economic, historical, cultural and social topics stemming from, or impacting, Central and Inner Asia. After opening remarks and words of welcome from Robert Bourgeneau (President of the University of Toronto), Prof. Michael Donnelly (University of Toronto Professor, and Director of the Asian Institute at the Munk Centre for International Studies) and Prof. Michael Gervers (University of Toronto Professor, and Director of the Central and Inner Asian Seminar), participants and audience members settled in for what proved to be two days of stimulating presentations and discussions.

While attracting many Western scholars, the Seminar also boasted an impressive showing of Central Eurasian academics, with Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Xinjiang and Uzbekistan all well represented. The topics covered a broad range of issues and resulted in lively dialogue between presenters and audience. Though the post-presentation questions were generally limited to fifteen minutes, social events in the evening proved to be an excellent opportunity for the continuation of discussions in a more relaxed environment. On the first evening a traditional Uyghur dinner, which included Uyghur dancing and entertainment, was hosted by Nicholas Corbett (University of Manitoba, presenter and assistant organizer) and Bahargul Abliz (independent scholar from Toronto and presenter). Then on the following evening Dr. Gillian Long (University of Toronto, organizer) opened her home to speakers and audience members alike for a dinner to wrap up the weekend's events.

In its ten years, the Central and Inner Asian Seminar has established a tradition of geographic diversity and interdisciplinary discourse. While there are many examples from this year's event that demonstrate this trend, the three selections outlined below exemplify both the breadth of topics and the level of scholarship of the 2004 proceedings.

Dr. Najam Abbas (Institute of Ismaili Studies, UK) presented his paper entitled "Tajikistan's Civil Society Environment: Endogenous Preferences and Exogenous Perceptions," which documents the current methods used by the international community and the Tajik government to stimulate the growth of civil society in that country. Dr. Abbas specifically focused on some of the shortfalls in the current system, particularly in the difficulties that NGOs encounter in identifying the local needs and conditions of a community and then communicating those needs and conditions to the administrators and sponsors who are supporting community-building initiatives. Dr. Abbas' analysis succinctly demonstrates the major factors, both at a local and national level, that are shaping the evolution of civil society in Tajikistan.

Dr. Craig Benjamin (Grand Valley State University, USA) presented "A Nation of Nomads? The Lifeway of the Yuezhi in the Gansu and Bactria." In his research, Dr. Benjamin seeks to reconcile the historical Chinese references to the Yuezhi as nomadic pastoralists with the archaeological evidence of their highly evolved system of commerce and society, indicative of a sedentary/agrarian tradition. Dr. Benjamin questioned some of the assumptions that have been made concerning this group and suggested alternative interpretations of the available archaeological and textual evidence, both in tracing the migration of the Yuezhi and in understanding their societal structure.

Another presentation of note was made by Duishan Shamatov (PhD Student, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto), titled "Teaching History in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: Challenges and Possibilities." Mr. Shamatov gave an in-depth account of the current Kyrgyz public school history curriculum and outlined some of the significant challenges that instructors of this subject are facing. In the post-Soviet states, history has been one of the first areas of the school curriculum to be restructured. However, according to Mr. Shamatov, the transition process has not been completely free from obstructions. In particular he emphasized some of the economic, social and political obstacles that are facing today's generation of history teachers. Mr. Shamatov illustrated his research using examples drawn from his interviews with teachers working in rural areas of Kyrgyzstan. He gave a compelling account of the political transition in that country as seen through the education system.

While the Seminar was set up such that only one speaker was presenting at a time, it was generally agreed by participants that this arrangement was good, as it allowed participants to attend all the presentations instead of having to choose between concurrent panels. As one participant pointed out, when speakers had traveled from as far away as Samarqand and Leeds to present their research, it was only fitting that they should have the opportunity to speak before as large an audience as could be accommodated. One unfortunate consequence of this arrangement was that time constraints limited the number of papers that could be included. As a result there was a waiting list of would-be-presenters who attended the conference with presentations in hand, hoping for an opening in the schedule.

The papers presented at the 2004 Central and Inner Asian Seminar will be published in Volume Seven of Toronto Studies in Central and Inner Asia. Should CESR readers wish to find out more about either this annual event or the Seminar's publications, they may consult the CIAS website at www.utoronto.ca/deeds/cias/cias.html, or contact Dr. Gillian Long at gillian.long utoronto.ca.

[Contents]

Nation-building in the Making: "Volga-Ural Studies" Workshop

Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, February 20-21, 2004

Reported by: Gönül Pultar, Department of English Language and Culture, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, gonulbilkent.edu.tr

A "Volga-Ural Studies" workshop, the first of its kind, was organized in Ankara on February 20-21, 2004 by Bilkent University's Seminars in Literature, Culture and Society. Interdisciplinary in nature, and international in participation, the workshop was open to discussion of all aspects of the history, literature, culture, and society of the region situated between the Volga River and the Ural Mountains. Located within what is today the Russian Federation, but inhabited largely by Turkic Chuvash, Tatar, and Bashkort peoples, and a much lesser population of Finno-Ugric Mari and Udmurt, the region is in a no-man's land as a field of study. The main goal of the workshop was therefore to foreground work that, either as papers at conferences or articles and monographs in publication, has tended to be occluded within a Central Asian studies paradigm, to which it appears not to belong by its geographical positioning. Thus, an equally important aim was to delineate and forge a specific field of scholarship.

The workshop was a follow-up to a one-day seminar entitled "Tatars and Tatarstan" organized in Istanbul in February 2003 at Marmara University. In her welcome address, Gönül Pultar, organizer of the workshop, paid tribute to Sadri Maksudi Arsal (who headed the short-lived "Turco-Tatar State of Inner Russia and Siberia" based in Ufa, 1917-1818) who died on February 20, 1957, and to his daughter, the late Adile Ayda who first established the tradition of commemorating him on that day. Pultar, Ali V. Turhan, and Gülnur Üçok, the three surviving grandchildren of Arsal, participated in the workshop, acting as chairs of sessions or paper presenters.

The keynote address was given by Halil İnalcik (Emeritus, University of Chicago and Bilkent University) who, in a talk entitled "How did Kazan Fall?", discussed the reasons for the downfall of the Kazan Khanate and its occupation in 1552 by the Muscovite princedom. According to İnalcık, the Ottomans could have helped Kazan withstand the Muscovite princedom, which had been one of the vassals of the Golden Horde state and was at the time not much stronger than its victim. But fearing that giving such assistance might lead to the rebirth of a powerful Turkic state in the north, the Ottomans refrained, a behavior İnalcık described as "lack of vision." What the Ottomans did not realize was that by not interfering with Muscovy's maneuvers, they allowed Muscovy to embark on the path that would lead it to play a larger role on the world scene.

The second keynote speaker, Mirfatih Zekiev [Mirfatykh Zakiev] (Galimjan Ibrahimov Institute, Kazan), discussed the ethnic and linguistic roots of the inhabitants of the region. In a talk entitled "The Ethnic History of the Idil-Ural Turks," Zekiev spoke on "ethnonyms," affirming that proto-Bulgars and Volga Bulgars had spoken the Turkish of the time, thus refuting the widespread "Chuvash" theory. "How to Safeguard Tatar Identity" was the theme of a second presentation Zekiev made. Discussing the cultural revival that has been taking place in Tatarstan since perestroika and glasnost, Zekiev noted the increase in acquisition of the Tatar language, and of publications aiding in this acquisition. In response to a question, he also spoke about the current Russian government's ban of the Latin alphabet that the autonomous republic of Tatarstan had wished to put into use in the fall of 2002.

Azade-Ayşe Rorlich of the University of Southern California gave a plenary lecture entitled "Identity and Collective Memory: The Changing Image of Suyumbike, the Tatar Queen." Rorlich discussed Suyumbike, who did her utmost to defend her patria in 1552, as the national and cultural icon that she has become. Rorlich asserted that no other personality in the history of the Tatar nation has acceded to such a position of historical prominence and symbolic representation.

The first session was devoted to a topic of heated controversy: the Tatar-Bashkort division. Two young scholars, Leysen Şahin (Marmara University), with a paper entitled "An Evaluation of Tatar-Bashkir Relations in the Context of 'Empire and the Issue of National Minorities,'" and Özkan Öztekten (Ege University, Izmir), with a paper entitled "The Bashkir Language as Outcome of the 'Tatar-Bashkir Question,'" tackled the issue head on. A lively debate on the sources of the conflict ensued. Most remarked during the session was the presence of the late former Bashkort president Zeki Velidi Toğan's children, İsenbike Toğan, who was to chair a session of the workshop, and Sübidey Toğan.

Other papers addressed topics as varied as naming, women in novels, Jadidism, ethnographic descriptions, identity, and history. As a whole, the workshop itself was an exercise in the current identity politics and nation-building process of the peoples of the region. Not only was it organized and attended by the offspring of former statesmen, evidently keeping a vigilant eye on the latest developments, but also present were the 86-year-old spiritual leader Akış, members of the diaspora living in Turkey, plus students from the region studying in various Turkish universities, who avidly followed the sessions and participated in the discussions. If nothing else, the workshop demonstrated that the peoples of the Volga-Ural region continue searching for and renegotiating an identity at home, and maintain hope that the 21st century will gratify their long pent-up national aspirations.

[Contents]

Workshop on Iran and Regional Developments

Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, December 18-19, 2003

Reported by: Bayram Sinkaya, Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey, bsinkayametu.edu.tr

Recent years have witnessed a flourishing cultural, economic and diplomatic interaction between Turkey and Iran. This developing regional interaction also involves cooperation between academic institutions in the two countries. Growing ties between the Ankara-based Middle East Technical University (METU) and the Tehran-based Institute of Political and International Studies (IPIS), a research arm of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, attest to this trend. Since the signing of a March 2003 agreement between the two institutions, academics and researchers from both sides have convened three times via workshops. The last of these workshops was held in METU on December 18-19, 2003 with the participation of Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour (IPIS), Saedeh Lotfian (Tehran University), Farhad Ataee (Imam Sadegh University), Saeed Khatibzadeh (IPIS) and numerous academic participants from METU.

The workshop was held in two sessions and chaired by Hüseyin Bağci (METU). Sajjadpour laid the ground by elaborating the relevance of studying Iranian foreign policy. He summarized Iran's importance through "three Ps": Place refers to the strategic location of Iran. Due to bordering often highly unstable regions which are geostrategically important to international players, Iran has an indispensable strategic role to play. Sajjadpour also emphasized the young and huge population of Iran, where as many as 50 percent of the nearly 70 million inhabitants are younger than 20 years of age. Furthermore, there is a place for perception, or the importance of the international image of Iran.

Sajjadpour also referred to the "three Cs" as a relevant theoretical framework to analyze Iranian foreign policy: Continuity indicates the cumulative influence of historical experiences that are closely linked to Iran's geostrategic location. Continuity alone, however, cannot help one understand Iranian foreign policy. The political conditions in the region and in Iran itself have been undergoing rapid transformations, all impacting on Iranian foreign policy. One also needs to take into account the complex decision making process in Iran. To illustrate this point, Sajjadpour referred to Iran's signing of the Additional Protocol to the Nonproliferation Treaty, which in his opinion "was very difficult domestically" to achieve due to the "many agencies, and bureaucratic units" involved, such as the Iranian Foreign Ministry, National Security Council, Revolutionary Guards, the military, and various propaganda organizations, each with their own agendas. He also referred to the differences between the "political elites [who] emerged before the revolution" and the "younger generation of elites," many of whom have no memory of the revolution. Drawing attention to changes in social structure such as urbanization, the rising middle class, and high literacy rates, Sajjadpour said that the ever-dynamic Iranian society is longing for openings to the outside world, but at the same time it wants to "restore international respect" for itself. Moreover, Sajjadpour maintained that "Iran has a big debating society," with public deliberations over "very fundamental issues, including those on security, which were previously unheard of." He mentioned the current discussions on religion and secularism, identity, justice, economic development, political liberty, and the debate on the focus, aims and instruments of Iran's foreign policy.

Lotfian focused on Iran's policy toward the Middle East in the post-Saddam era. She underlined Iran's respect for the Iraqi people's choice and desire for seeing a democratic regime installed. Lotfian added that Iran is "neutral but not indifferent," saying, for example, that "Iran will not interfere with any decision taken by Iraqis," but will not be "content with the idea of the partitioning of Iraq." Talking about weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), Lotfian noted that "the Iranian government, while insisting to abide by the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT), emphasizes its right to peaceful nuclear technology." Referring to double standards on the issue, she underlined that the US and Russia have 90 percent of all nuclear arsenals worldwide. Furthermore, the United States is silent when it comes to Israeli nuclear activities and arsenals in the Middle East. On the other hand, she contended that Iranian policy toward the Palestine/Israel issue is determined by national interests rather than ideological considerations. Lotfian argued that Iranian "support for Palestinian groups [has been] justified on two grounds": morality - when dealing with a group of stateless Islamic people suffering from Israeli occupation, Iran has an obligation to support them; and realism - because Israel has been causing (unspecified) problems for Iran, Iran responds by creating further difficulties for Israel. Referring to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei's statements on the issue, she argued that in the Iranian leadership's view, one legitimate solution is that Palestinian refugees should be allowed to return to Palestine and have the right of self-determination.

Ataee, in his address on Iranian policy towards Central Asia and the Caucasus, argued that Iran's position is strongly affected by political and cultural incentives rather than economic calculations. Regarding Afghanistan, he observed that "the question of Afghanistan is not resolved [and that] all groups within [Afghanistan] and states in the region are waiting for the US [presidential] election." Ataee argued that, in view of Afghan factions, irrespective of whether Bush or a Democratic candidate wins the November 2004 election, the US would not further engage itself in Afghanistan. Therefore, the ongoing uncertainty about the future of Afghanistan remains a major foreign policy concern for Iran.

Khatibzadeh talked about Turkey-Iran relations. Having briefly discussed Iran's new policy of détente, decontainment and engagement with neighboring countries, initiated after President Khatami's accession to power, Khatibzadeh proposed a three-level approach to examining Turkish-Iranian relations: bilateral, including security issues and commercial relations; regional, including issues relating to Afghanistan, Iraq, Persian Gulf security, etc.; and international, referring to terrorism, globalization, etc. In particular, he elaborated on common security concerns, such as the potential disintegration of Iraq and the role of the Kurds in Iraq and the region. Khatibzadeh maintained that as neighboring states, Turkey and Iran should work closely with each other, but he cautioned that improving relations between the two is a "cognitive process" that needs to be seen as a long-term project with careful planning.

[Contents]

Educational Resources and Developments

Earth Odyssey: Uzbekistan. Using the Web to Connect American High School and University Students with Personal Experiences in Uzbekistan

Vika Gardner, PhD Candidate, Department of Near Eastern Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., USA, vikaumich.edu; Jeff Stanzler, Lecturer, School of Education, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., USA, stanzumich.edu

College classrooms are not typically integrated with high school classrooms, particularly when it comes to teaching about Central Eurasia. Yet an innovative program designed by the Interactive Communications and Simulations (ICS) Group at the University of Michigan's School of Education has allowed the Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies (CMENAS) to create a mentoring program for both high school students and UM undergraduate and graduate students who all interact through a website about Uzbekistan.[12]

The ICS Group dates back to the early 1980s, when it first began sponsoring a character-playing simulation on the Arab-Israeli Conflict for a worldwide network of middle and high schools. Since then, thousands of students around the world have participated in ICS projects. Current activities include "Place out of Time," a historical simulation in which guests from every corner of the world and of history convene at the Alhambra Palace in Granada, Spain to consider issues of security in the post-9/11 world. Non-simulation activities include a "Poetry Guild," a youth-oriented news service called "Highest Wire," and, since 1991, "Earth Odyssey." Earth Odyssey is an interdisciplinary adventure learning activity that "sends" students to places they may never visit in person. Using an interactive web site, students learn about the world's geographical and human diversity as well as the rich and varied cultural expressions of its people by reading and discussing "reports" posted by a traveler in a specific area. After six months of planning and writing, through the sponsorship of the CMENAS, the ICS Group first offered the Uzbekistan Odyssey project in the winter semester of 2003.[13] It was offered for a second time in Fall 2003. The next scheduled course will be in Fall 2004.

Participants in the Odyssey fall into two categories. The first consists of middle school and high school groups who register to take part in the term-long Earth Odyssey project. These students engage in discussions that are facilitated by the second category of participants, graduate and undergraduate university student "mentors," who simultaneously study about Uzbekistan and about pedagogy in a class taught by the authors. The secondary students participate via the website and receive some assistance from their classroom teachers, who are in contact with the university instructors. The first semester (winter 2003) included high school students in Michigan and Maryland; second semester (fall 2003) participants were from the same Maryland school and from a high school in Vermont whose teacher was the co-author of a curriculum unit on Central Eurasia (see below). The teachers' schools provide Internet access; otherwise their participation is underwritten by CMENAS. While typically the author of the Odyssey is actually traveling when posting the reports, in this case Vika Gardner wrote the reports after she returned to the US. This enables her to be in the classroom with the college students, and where possible to visit the high school students while the Odyssey is under way.

Discussions unfold in response to reports written by Vika Gardner from Uzbekistan, where she lived during the summer of 1997 and September 2000 through December 2001, and was accepted into an Uzbek family while doing her archival research on a religious figure from the 16th century.[14] Her experience as a family member was different from that of a typical traveler who spends comparatively little time in Central Asia. As with her curriculum unit for teaching about Central Eurasia to high school students (Gardner and Steponaitis 2000; Gardner 2002), the intent of her Uzbekistan Odyssey is not only to present ordinary life in Uzbekistan, but also to help the students, both high school and college, reflect on what they have and how they live in the United States. The project is intended to foster a feeling among the high school students that they themselves are participating in a journey, a journey accompanied by a rich discussion with their peers and between the students and the mentors.[15]

Because secondary-level media must address educational standards in order to find a place in the classroom, several general fields are addressed across the reports, such as economics, ethnography, and politics. The reports discuss the physical environment (apartments, bathrooms, bazaars, utilities), social relations (families, parties, gender relations), food and politics (bribery, naming, public services). The point of the reports is not a general survey, but personal experience, painted in an accessible vocabulary. In order to catch the students' interest, issues are often couched in terms of questions that the author poses. For instance, one report discusses shopping in the bazaars in Tashkent. In addition to talking about how much items cost, how difficult it can be to do the math, and what kinds of techniques are needed, the report discusses the ethics of being a "wealthy" foreigner in a situation where bargaining assertively - a culturally valued practice - means taking money away from those who have less. The report does this by presenting a variety of views from people within Uzbekistan, people who have been presented in other contexts as well, so that the students can "make friends" with citizens of Uzbekistan. A series of reports presents a trip to a small town near Bukhara for a circumcision ceremony; the discussion includes many details of gendered interactions, for instance, of spaces where women are permitted to be, and how decisions about women's clothing are made for women. The reports are short - typically only a page or two - sparking the students' curiosity. Pedagogically, the design prompts them to ask questions, helping them to think about how they would feel or react in a similar situation. Thus, instead of necessarily standing apart from the realities of life on the ground in Uzbekistan, the students' involvement and active participation "writes" the text, bringing it to life in response to each student.

The basic format allows reports from Uzbekistan to become available on pre-defined days, delimiting the discussion and carefully structuring development of concepts during the term. Photographs taken by the author illustrate most reports, and captions provide additional details. The site also provides for optional "glossary" items, links that open pop-up explanations (sometimes with pictures) of people, places, and terms with which the students and mentors may not be familiar. Both the students and the mentors can direct questions to the reports' author and receive quick responses. This is a distinct advantage over using a textbook or an article, especially for a high school class where a teacher may have limited information on an area like Central Eurasia and thus not be able to answer questions. If Gardner cannot answer the question herself, she can always obtain answers from her host family in Uzbekistan. Although not interactive in an immediate sense - it is difficult to give answers in "real time" when schools using the site are in different time zones - this give-and-take sparks critical thinking among some of the high school students, and fosters a real interest in the region.

The second group of participants is the university student "mentors" who facilitate the students' discussions and meet once a week in the college classroom. Since the class is not a required course for undergraduate teacher certification candidates, most of its students do not have teaching as an academic or career focus and come from outside the School of Education. The Uzbekistan Odyssey conducted in Fall 2003 saw an influx of students from a combined Master's and Certification Program, which enriched discussions of pedagogical issues. The university instructors, Jeff Stanzler and Vika Gardner, provide content expertise as well as communication skills training. The university class helps the mentors gain confidence both in their knowledge and their decision-making abilities. One goal is to provide a crash course in the part of the world being discussed, Uzbekistan. For the first four weeks of the class, the mentors intensively study Uzbekistan, reading several articles per week that focus on ethnicity and politics in post-independence Uzbekistan. Because to date none of the mentors have anything more than a rudimentary knowledge of the region, these preliminary weeks are designed to provide the mentors with enough information to contextualize (and interrogate) Gardner's reports. Like most novice teachers, the mentors learn as they go, becoming acquainted with the central topics of the project just ahead of the secondary school students. Once the Odyssey is under way, attention shifts to the second goal, to train the mentors as facilitators and teachers. The process of mentoring is "on the job training," made the more difficult because there is no face-to-face contact with the students, and the mentors lack the kind of information a classroom teacher would have about his or her students.[16] The mentors learn how to develop among the students the ability to define and articulate their own ideas, read their own writing and that of others with a critical eye, and take a fresh look at their own lives by aspiring to understand how others live theirs. Content-based discussions in the college classroom tease out student errors of fact and explore additional reading keyed to the major topics in the reports.

One of the challenges for the mentors is the diversity of student backgrounds and perspectives, something that can affect group dynamics in the on-line discussions just as it does in a classroom. Both the mentors and their students need to be trained to keep an open mind about multiple perspectives in a conversation. In addition to the on-line interaction, the mentors create lesson plans that attempt to integrate the Odyssey into a classroom activity or plan. These lesson plans, which form a library from which later users of the Odyssey can draw when using the site, allow the university students to explore in greater depth ideas or issues presented in the reports. Some of the mentors have done significant work with primary sources such as Uzbek-language newspapers and magazines.

We have been impressed by the seriousness with which the university students take their roles as mentors and how much they have learned from the process. For example, one of the Business School mentors found a connection between the class and a psychology course that he was taking on group behavior. He expressed surprise at what some of the students were willing to post publicly, and in the process of deciding how to share his own ideas, he learned how closely intertwined are discussions of "substantive issues" with larger questions of human interactions. Another of our mentors expressed something of a teacher's pride at his realization that as the term ended he was seeing several postings that were truly making him think, reversing the experience from early in the term when he felt that he was the one who had to make the students think. On the content side, the university students become knowledgeable about the diversity of the region; like the secondary students, having formed a personal connection to Uzbekistan, they have a basis for looking into the region further. It is as if they have had conversations with a variety of citizens from Uzbekistan, and they can see that each commentator's "truth" does not necessarily make another one's "false."

In the end, one must address the question: Does such a program work? For the college students, it is an opportunity to develop hands-on skills in mentoring, which, of course, is a specialized form of communication in many different careers. The project has surveyed both participants and teachers to determine its success in high schools. Students at John Glenn High School in Michigan reported that they now understand more about Uzbekistan. Their teacher said that the Odyssey was more successful in engaging the students than his usual "world affairs" unit had been. One of the best tributes was the evaluation by Wafa Hozien, the teacher in Maryland who participated in both semesters:

I have found nothing more powerful than the Odyssey experience via University of Michigan since I started teaching 12 years ago. To see students evolve from regular American students to (being) worldly, cultured and sensitive to others' views... is remarkable.

There are plans to run the Uzbekistan Odyssey again in the fall of 2004, and other Odysseys are under way. High schools teachers who would like to participate should contact Jeff Stanzler at stanzumich.edu or at (734) 763-5950.

References

Gardner, Vika

2002 "Polishing the mirror: a teaching unit on Central and Inner Eurasia," Central Eurasian Studies Review, 1 (1) 34-35.

Gardner, Vika, and R. T. Steponaitis

2000 Polishing the Mirror: A Curriculum Unit on Central and Inner Eurasia. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies, July 2000.

1 For an in-depth discussion of this issue see Esenova (2002).

[1] I adopt a broad understanding of the term "diaspora." Here it is seen as a "trans-border ethnic community" (King and Melvin 1998: 8) created "not by people crossing borders, but by the moving of borders across settlements" (Kolstø 1999: 610).

[2] For reasons of brevity I reduce the possible strategies to a binary opposition. Obviously, the reality is different and strategies are more complex.

[3] I particularly refer to reports by the International Crisis Group (ICG), which throughout the years has constantly paid attention to the events in the Ferghana Valley from a security perspective.

[4] The International Crisis Group report on border disputes and conflict potential (2002) suggests that separatist tendencies might paradoxically increase should Uzbekistan liberalize its political system.

[5] Political elites are deputies in national, provincial, and city assemblies, members and leaders of political parties, and other actors in key positions in the state administration. Cultural elites are leaders and members of Uzbek cultural organizations, intellectuals, academics, researchers, students, and employees of international organizations. Economic elites are businessmen.

[6] One of the major grievances of the Uzbek population in Kyrgyzstan concerns the use of Uzbek in education and media.

[7] Data were analyzed through the use of SPSS, a statistical software for social sciences.

[8] The purposive, non-random sample comprised 136 respondents.

[9] This includes answers such as "world," "Soviet Union," "Central Asia," and "Ferghana Valley."

[10] A cross-tabulation was carried out to examine the strength of the relationship between demographic variables and responses. I used Cramer's V to measure the association between the nominal variables, where values range from 0 (no association) to 1 (perfect association). The received value of .580 indicates a strong correlation between the type of location (urban/rural) and the response.

[11] 13.7% gave "no response" to this question.

[12] The current address of the site is http://kawa.soe.umuch.edu/ody/vika; because of privacy concerns for the high school students involved, the site does not permit open access.

[13] It was through the efforts of Michael Fahy of CMENAS that the present authors created this particular "journey."

[14] Gardner's research in Uzbekistan, on Ahmad ibn Mavlana Jalal ad-Din Khwajagi Kasani (d. 1542), was funded by an Indiana University Office of International Programs Pre-Dissertation Travel Grant (1997) and by an International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) grant and a Fulbright-Hays grant from the US Dept. of Education (2000-2001). While the research they funded does not directly touch on the Odyssey, the Odyssey could not have come into being without this financial support.

[15] The curriculum unit is available from the University of Michigan, Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies, (734) 764-0350 or cmenasumich.edu.

[16] An exception was a visit by the university class to one of the participating Michigan schools which provided the opportunity for the students to meet their mentors and for Gardner to show artifacts from Uzbekistan.

[Contents]

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CESR Central Eurasian Studies Review

Contents of this issue

Perspectives

Research Reports

Reviews and Abstracts

Conferences and Lecture Series

Educational Resources and Developments

Editors - CESR Vol. 3 No. 2

Perspectives

Eurasian Studies in Turkey

Academic Studies

Research Centers

Policy Research

Conclusion

Research Reports

Narratives of Migration and Kazakh Identity

References

Uzbek Communities in the Kyrgyz Republic and Their Relationship to Uzbekistan

Research Content, Questions, and Methods

Survey Results

Preliminary Findings

References

Politics and Public Policy in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Case of Higher Education Reform in Kyrgyzstan

Research Methodology

Major Actors in Educational Policy-Making in Kyrgyzstan

Politics and Higher Education in Kyrgyzstan: Initial Conclusions

References

The Soviet Policy of Economic Nationalization in Uzbekistan and its Consequences, 1917-1940

Research Findings

References

Reviews and Abstracts

References

References

References

References

References

Conferences and Lecture Series

The Tenth Annual Central and Inner Asian Seminar

Nation-building in the Making: "Volga-Ural Studies" Workshop

Workshop on Iran and Regional Developments

Educational Resources and Developments

Earth Odyssey: Uzbekistan. Using the Web to Connect American High School and University Students with Personal Experiences in Uzbekistan

References

Issues of CESR

CESR
Central Eurasian Studies Review